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The law of state succession is one of the most complicated issues in
public international law.1 Although it has been dealt with since the
beginning of human interest in the field of relations among different
political entities,2 scholars, economists and politicians have seldom
'This work is dedicated to my wife, Ludovica.
* Ph.D. candidate,UniversitA degli Studi di Padova, Italy; J.D.,UniversitA degli Studi
Milano Bicocca, Italy; LL.M. in Internation and Comparative Law, Tulane Law School. I
would like to thank Professor Alberto Miele and Enrico Zamuner, Ph.d. (University of
Padova), Professor Tullio Scovazzi (University of Milano - Bicocca), Professor Gunther
Handl (Tulane Law School), and Professor William Anthony Lovett (Tulane Law School)
for their interesting suggestions and the useful discussions on this topic.
1. See, ROBERT YEWDALL JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (1963); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
654 (4" ed. 1990).
2. The definition of international relations - implying states as major subjects in the
international arena - demands a definition of international community (see, e.g., Christian
Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will, 241 RECUEIL
DES COURS 195, 232-236 (1993), discussing the theoretical foundations of the
international community) and INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS
(Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991), especially the general introduction by the editor, at 1,
and the article by Luigi Condorelli, Custom, at 179. Notwithstanding this caveat, and the
fact that most scholars regard modern international community a product of the
Westphalia Peace (1648), early descriptions of succession among political entities are
provided by Grotius (see GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES, Vol. II, Ch. IX, §
XII (Aalen 1993) (1625).
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reached an agreement on what the real legal rules are on how to treat
this phenomenon. This note will analyze the case of the succession of
Yugoslavia and some of the problems raised by the disintegration of
that country into separate republics, paying special regards to the fate
of its financial obligations.
In order to address these concerns, the First Section will "set the
stage", providing some relevant facts that occurred before the Yugoslav
Federation broke up. The Second Section is an attempt to summarize
the present "state of the law" regarding state succession and financial
obligations (public debts). The Third Section will focus on the specific
problem of the distinction between succession as a phenomenon of fact,
on one side, and its consequences on the other, taking into account
historical cases as well as more recent events in Central and Eastern
Europe. Finally, the Fourth Section will deal with the fate of Yugoslav
public debts in the aftermath of its dissolution: the many options that
were proposed and various theoretical and practical problems faced by
the successor states. It will also try and assess the policy of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro)3 as regarding the apportionment of the former
Yugoslavia's public debt and the seemingly viable solution envisaged in
recent agreements .
I. THE CRISIS OF YUGOSLAVIA
In 1989, the tide was definitively turning against planned
economies and socialist parties all over Eastern Europe. In particular,
because of the deadly mixture of bad planning and populist promises,
the Yugoslav federation was suffering a terrible financial crisis.5 The
federal government launched a 'shock therapy' to curb inflation and
boost foreign investment. One year later, in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia and Slovenia political pluralism developed: new nationalistic
parties - clearly anti-communist and, thus, anti-federation - were
quickly formed and won elections throughout the year.' On the other
side, in Belgrade, the Serbian Assembly suspended Kosovo's
government and parliament after Milosevic was elected Serbian
president with 65% of the popular vote. The election of Milosevic was a
signal that Serbia was in the field of the republics supporting
3. The denomination of the Yugoslav Federation (FRY) after April 27", 1992.
4. Before its dissolution, Yugoslavia was known as the Federal Socialist Republic of
Yugoslavia (FSRY). This denomination, as well as those of 'former federation', 'former
Yugoslavia', or simply 'Yugoslavia' will be used throughout this note.
5. On the economical situation of Yugoslavia, see Valerie Bunce, The Elusive Peace
in the Former Yugoslavia, 28 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 709, 712 (1995) and cited references.
6. See Konrad G. Bdhler, State Succession, Identity I Continuity and Membership in
the United Nations, in LA SUCCESSION D'ETATS: LA CODIFICATION A L'9PREUVE DES FAITS -
STATE SUCCESSION: CODIFICATION TESTED AGAINST THE FACTS 274-78 (Pierre Michel
Eisemann & Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2000) [hereinafter Eisemann & Koskenniemi].
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nationalism and rejecting a decentralization of the political and
economic system.
7
From that moment on, the struggle to keep the federation united -
at least as a confederation of sovereign states - interfered with the
struggle of Serbia to 'protect' its nationals who happened to be living in
other republics; also, Milosevic was advocating a 'strong Serbia' as the
leading force to promote a 'strong Yugoslavia'. The fact that the army
was seen as mostly Serbian in its higher cadres, and strongly pro-
federation, created a potentially powerful tool in the hands of its
leadership, but, even more, a reason for strong suspicion about the role
of the military within the republics.8 Moreover, this attempt for a
centralizing policy on the part of the Serbian leadership caught the
federal institutions in a moment of particular crisis; in fact, the
economic package launched in 1990 under an IMF Stand-by Agreement
(SBA) and a World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL II) required
large budget cuts and redirection of federal revenues towards debt
servicing. This led to the suspension of transfer payments by the center
to the governments of the Republics and autonomous provinces, thereby
creating even more discomfort towards the federal authorities, in a
moment of great distress.9
This internal situation also found the international community
unwilling, at least in part, to deal with the task of relieving the
situation.' In 1991, while the eyes of the world were focused on the
Gulf War, Tudjman and Milosevig were secretly meeting at Karadjordje
to discuss territorial partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the first military
outbreaks took place in Croatia, and Serbs of Krajina in a local
referendum declared their willingness to remain part of Yugoslavia.
Slovenia and Croatia declared their own sovereignty at the end of
7. Bihler, supra note 6, at 274-78.
8. An interesting analysis of the path from one Yugoslav nationalism to the
multitude of 'post-Yugoslav' nationalisms is provided in OLIVIER LADIsLAv KUBLI, Du
NATIONALISME YUGOSLAVE AUX NATIONALISMES POST-YOUGOSLAVES, (1998). See also
LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION, (1996) (especially Part
One).
9. MICHEL CHOSSUDOvSKY, THE GLOBALISATION OF POVERTY - IMPACTS OF IMF AND
WORLD BANK REFORMS 246 (1997). See also SUSAN WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY:
CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 40 (1995) and Ann Orford, Locating the
International: Military and Monetary Interventions After the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 443, 452 (1997).
10. There seemed to be strong support for maintaining the territorial integrity of the
federation on part of the United States, the European Community and its members, the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as Russia. Such a position
undoubtedly strengthened the perception in the Yugoslav and in the Serbian leaderships
that flexibility was not required in negotiations, since independence for Slovenia and
Croatia was not supported internationally. See Marc Weller, The International Response
to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569,
570 (1992).
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June;" it is true that, at this very moment, the EC began an arms
embargo, freezing all economic aid to Yugoslavia in July in an effort to
try and ease the situation, but then the attention was diverted to
Moscow, where Gorbachev was declared 'sick' and then came back -
under the 'protective' wings of Yeltsin - after one of the strangest coups
in history. The only action taken by the European Community was the
establishment of a 'Peace Conference' on Yugoslavia; such an action,
that would prove to be very important for the resolution of the legal
problems linked to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, would be virtually
useless in regards to the conflicts and the political solution to the
crisis. 12 Macedonia, too, declared its independence in September, 3 and
only this triggered the first United Nations' action, when the Security
Council adopted a Resolution 4 for an embargo on arms sales to
Yugoslavia.
11. In this context, it is interesting to note the impact of the first casualties,
atrocities, and human rights violations not only on the international community, but, in
the first place, on the people of former Yugoslavia itself. The alienation towards the
central government on part of the general public greatly increased during the first
skirmishes in Slovenia and Croatia, as well as the deep distrust towards the Federal
Army (JNA).
12. At a meeting held in Brussels on August 27, 1991, the EC had actually agreed to
convene a peace conference on Yugoslavia that would bring together the Federal
presidency and the Federal Government of Yugoslavia, the Presidents of the six republics,
the president of the EC Council and representatives of the EC Commission and EC
member states. In this framework, an arbitration procedure would enhance the rule of
law in the settlement of disputes. This Arbitration Commission was to be made up of
three members appointed by the EC and two unanimously appointed by the collective
Yugoslav Presidency. However, this body never reached an agreement, and the three
members appointed by the EC chose to appoint the other two. At the first meeting, the
five members decided to elect as Chairman Mr. Badinter, the President of the French
Conseil Constitutionnel. This Commission [hereinafter, Badinter Commission, or
Commission] received the full support of the United States and of the USSR; in August
1992 it was replaced by the UN/EC International Conference on Yugoslavia For more
information about the role of the Commission in the Yugoslav crisis, see Maurizio Ragazzi,
Introductory Note, 31 I.L.M. 1488,1490 (1992). For a critique of the activity of the
Commission, see Michla Pomerance, The Badinter Commission: The Use and Misuse of the
International Court of Justice's Jurisprudence, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 31 (1998). As regards
the Opinions rendered by the Commission, see Badinter Commission, infra note 17, §3.
13. Macedonia is now widely recognized, although with the name of "Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM); it was admitted to the UN in April 1993 (see
Susan Woodward, Are International Institutions Doing Their Job?, 90 AM. SOCY INT'L L.
PROC. 471, 473 (1996)). For the purposes of this note, the denomination of Macedonia will
be adopted.
14. S. C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1991), repealed after the
Dayton Agreement through S. C. Res. 1021, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1021 (1995). At
the meeting in 1991, the situation was especially confused, as demonstrated by the fact
that the Yugoslav representative, in an unprecedented move, requested that a complete
embargo be adopted through mandatory Security Council action under Chapter VII
against the country he was representing (U.N. Doc. S/PV.3009, at 17). For a vivid
description of the meeting, see Weller, supra note 10, at 578-79.
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If the Security Council was no longer hostage to the vetoes by the
Superpowers, one of which was rapidly losing its status, it could do no
more than condemn and adopt weak actions, without being able to
promote any real diplomatic solution for events that were clearly
developing as 'a threat to international peace and security."' In
October, the situation appeared even more complex: Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia were on the verge of
becoming independent countries, leaving Montenegro with Serbia as
the two remaining constituent parts of the Federation; the question
seemed to be only one of timing and of the legal framework to contain
the more than likely outbreak of violence. At this point, the European
Community finally decided to take a stand, one that looked bold to
many: it would not recognize newly independent countries in Eastern
Europe if they did not meet high criteria, never heard before in the field
of states' recognition.'" This action could have had a 'chilling' effect on
the rush towards independence that many republics were showing, and
it could have also promoted a more coherent approach by other
important countries - the United States, the fellow Non-aligned
countries, the newly emerging independent Russia together with the
other republics, all eager for international support and recognition
themselves. But the European Community was not able to live up to its
own set standards.
On December 23rd, 1991 Germany decided to unilaterally recognize
Slovenia and Croatia as independent countries, thus defeating the
substantive requirements - as well as even the timetable - previously
agreed on." The rest of the Community followed suit on January 15',
15. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations deals with "Actions with respect
to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." In particular, the
Security Council has primary responsibility to "determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and [to] make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain
or restore international peace and security." (U.N. CHARTER, art. 39).
16. The Declaration on Yugoslavia was issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial
Meeting held on December 16, 1991, in Brussels (see 31 I.L.M. 1485 (1992)). It contained
the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet
Union, [hereinafter Guidelines] where the member States agreed to "recognise, subject to
the normal standards of international practice and the political realities in each case,
those new states which, following the historic changes in the region, have constituted
themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the appropriate international obligations
and have committed themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiations."
(emphasis added). On this point, see Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic
Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 90-91 (1992). As regards the 'appropriate international
obligations', the guidelines explained that the process of recognition required, inter alia,
"commitment to settle by agreement [... 1 all questions regarding state succession and
regional disputes". On the relevance of this specification, see Badinter Commission,
Opinion n. 5, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1503.
17. See Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 5, supra note 16, at § 3, suggesting Croatia
was not fully 'ready' to be recognized: in fact, the Constitution of December 4, 1991, did
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respecting the formal dateline, but not necessarily the standards
proposed in the Guidelines. More importantly, on April 6" the
European Community recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina (despite negative
Badinter Commission advice)"s and refused to grant recognition of
Macedonia, due to the Greek veto (despite positive Badinter
Commission advice).'9  On the next day, the United States, too,
recognized Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 0 while, on April
27t', Serbia and Montenegro declared the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia to be the 'continuation' of the dismantled SFRY. This
happened while a surge of violence was taking place in the territory of
the republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; especially in the
latter, war crimes and terrible human rights violations occurred,21
creating an environment where effective negotiations among the parties
was difficult to start, let alone succeed.
II. THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION
This note purports to shed some light on the legal principles
governing the transfer of financial obligations due to the succession in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In order to accomplish this aim,
however, it is necessary to reach an agreement on the terminology that
will be used, a common problem in dealing with international law
theory to be applied in practice. In particular, the definitions of 'state' -
and the relevance of recognition -, of debt, and of succession seem
necessary hermeneutical 'tools' for our purposes.
A. The State
Although this might seem an academic question with no practical
not sufficiently incorporate the suggested provisions on the autonomy of minorities;
written reiteration by President Tudjman of the commitments to protect the 'special
status' of minorities, however, was deemed sufficient (see Weller, supra, note 10, at 593.
As for Slovenia, see Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 7, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1512 (declaring
that Slovenia met the requirements). On the question of the legality of secession by
Croatia and Slovenia, an early view was provided by Richard Iglar, Comment: The
Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the International Law of Self-Determination:
Slovenia's and Croatia's Right to Secede, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.REv. 228 (1992).
18. Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 4, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1501. On the international
subjectivity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, see Matthew Craven, The European Community
Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, 66 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 333, 375 (1995).
19. Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 6, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1507.
20. The United Nations recognized Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina on May
22, 1992, (U.N. Press Release, ORG/1156, Jan. 19, 1993).
21. See S.C. Res. 752, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/752 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 145
(demanding compliance with the April 12, 1992 cease-fire and urging to stop "violent
deterioration" of the situation) and S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/757
(1992), 31 I.L.M. 1453 (calling for "immediate cessation of forcible expulsions and
attempts to change the ethnic composition of the populace").
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consequences, many discussions have actually arisen about the legal
threshold of what really constitutes a State, especially with regard to
the break-up of Yugoslavia.n The Restatement23 clarifies that an entity
must satisfy four requirements for statehood: territory,? permanent
population, government and capacity to conduct international relations.
Some of these elements, however, are quite loosely defined. For
example, the territory requirement seems to be satisfied even though its
boundaries have not been finally settled;2 5 also, the definition of
permanent population comprises situations like the one of the Vatican
City - with a mere 400 citizens and a total of around 750 permanent
residents.26 This is one of the reasons why it is possible to affirn that
the government, with its effective jurisdiction within state borders
and/or on the population, and its innate capacity to enter into relation
with other subjects of international law is clearly the most relevant
characterizing aspects of the State."
What is important to note, however, is that scholars are generally
agreed that an entity fulfilling these requirements is a State as such,
and does not need any kind of recognition by the 'international
community' to become a member.2 But, obviously, things are not as
22. In general, "all theories of succession must be funded in some general view of the
State, and on the relations between, on the one hand, the State and its internal legal
order and, on the other, that legal order and the international legal order of the
community of States." (O'Connell cited in James Crawford, The Contribution of Professor
D. P. O'Connell to the Discipline of International Law, 1980 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 23).
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §201
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; see especially Comments b to e. Although there are other,
very interesting, theories on the identity of states, this definition seems very useful in
describing the events in Central and Eastern Europe during the last decade of the
Twentieth Century, and will be therefore used in this work as a ground basis.
24. See Island of Palmas Case (1928), 2 RIAA 829, 839 (Judge Huber), stating that
"Territorial sovereignty ... involves the exclusive right to display the activities of a
State." Id.
25. See P.K, MENON, THE LAW OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (1994).
26. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 36-7
(1979); MENON, supra note 26, at 58-9.
27. See GAETANO ARANGIO-RUIZ, L'ETAT DANS LE SENS DU DROIT DES GENS ET LA
NOTION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 297 (1975); see also ALBERTO MIELE, GLi STATI 4-
5(2001).
28. In international law, the question of recognition arises when a new state emerges
and I[... I seeks to establish relations with other existing states and also when it applies
for membership of the UN and other international [... I organizations." SEN, A
DIPLOMAT'S HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 501 (3 d ed. 1988) cited in
Mirjam Skrk, Recognition of States and Its (Non-)Implications on State Succession: The
Case of Successor States to the Former Yugoslavia, SUCCESSION OF STATES 15-31 (Mojmir
Mrak ed.,1998) [hereinafter Mrak]. Moreover, scholars have extensively drawn
distinctions between the recognition of States and the recognition of governments, the
latter being just a gesture of acceptance in the transition of governments within the
constitutional - domestic - order of a State. The establishment of diplomatic relations is
still a different matter, usually relating to mere political appreciation of a specific
government in a given situation. See MENON, supra, note 26, at 61-4; see also H.
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simple as that. Whether an entity satisfies the requirements for
statehood is ordinarily determined by other states when they decide to
treat that entity as a state.29 Moreover, many believe there is actually
no duty to recognize another entity as a state, although there is at least
a duty not to recognize an entity not fulfilling the above-mentioned
requirements." Thus, although recognition may not be theoretically
claimed to be a necessary step on the way to statehood, it may represent
an important achievement for a state-to-be or, even more, for a new
state.
During the last decade of the past century, however, the
dissolutions of Yugoslavia and the USSR have prompted a new attitude
by some countries - in particular, the European Community and its
members - which tried to establish other criteria to be admitted within
the international community. Specifically, the E.C. issued the now
famous "Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe
and in the Soviet Union", envisaging the standards new states are
supposed to meet in order to be deemed worthy of recognition. s' In
particular, the guidelines declare that those European countries are
ready to recognize, "subject to the normal standards of international
practice and the political realities in each case, those new states which,
following the historic changes in the region, have constituted
themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the appropriate
international obligations and have committed themselves in good faith
to a peaceful process and to negotiations."3 2 This part was clarified in
the "commitment to settle by agreement ... all questions concerning
state succession and regional disputes."3
Much has been written and said regarding the 'democratic
governance' element as one creating a new level of control in the hands
of the international community.' But what is relevant for the present
discussion is, rather, the requirement of the need to accept the
appropriate international obligations in order to be recognized as a new
subject of international law. What are these obligations? Do they
comprise financial obligations of the predecessor state? Who is entitled
to define them and to decide whether these entities have accepted
them? Arguably, the answer to the latter question is the European
LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 88 (1947) (affirming the entitlement
of validly constituted governments to recognition).
29. RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at § 201, comment h.
30. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 94-95 (1979).
31. See Guidelines, supra note 16, at 1486.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Id.
34. For the emergence of the criterion of 'democratic governance' even before the case
of Yugoslavia, see Franck, supra note 16. For an early appraisal of this trend as regards




Community and its member States, those who issued these guidelines
and were thus, probably, the more interested in abiding by them.35 So,
in regard to the history of the swift break-up of Yugoslavia and the
problem raised during its succession, it is important to take into
account these political statements, as well as the way they were
interpreted through subsequent practice.
B. The Debts
Regarding the definition of what is a 'state debt', different scholars
have presented slightly different views, and it might be useful to focus
on some of them. Jennings and Watts write: "A state debt is any
financial obligation of a predecessor state arising in conformity with
international law towards another state, an international organization
or any other subject of international law. On the passing of state debts
the obligations of the predecessor state are extinguished and the
obligations of the successor state in respect of the state debts which
pass to it arise."36
The 1983 Convention 37 simply described a "state debt" as all those
"financial obligations undertaken by a state in conformity with
international law." One conceptual problem is posed by the fact that
the 1983 Convention was limited to dealing with debts contracted by
sovereigns with other subjects of international law, thus excluding
foreign nationals.38 In any case, there appears to be no doubt that
financial obligations, whether towards a foreign sovereign or a foreign
national, will be protected to a certain extent.3' On one hand, it is true
35. Ironically, many authors have pointed to the fact that those very European
countries could not force themselves to abide by these new self-imposed standards. In
fact, they promptly recognized: Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose status as a state was highly
questionable at the time, and Croatia, whose standards of democratic governance hardly
met any requirement especially in relation to minorities. See Weller, supra note 10, at
586.
36. JENNINGS & WATTS, 1 OPPENHEIMER'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 244 (9th ed. 1993).
37. Vienna Convention in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, April 8,
1983, 22 I.L.M. 298 [hereinafter 1983 Convention]; this convention has never entered into
force, and it is largely thought not to reflect customary international law. It has been
ratified only by Croatia, Egypt, Georgia, Macedonia and Ukraine. See Multilateral
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General (Status as on Dec. 31, 2000), U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER/E 19 (2001). On the debate about the 1983 Convention, See Eli Nathan,
The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and
Debts, INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY (ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI
ROSENNE) 489 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1989).
38. Art. 33 of the 1983 Convention, supra note 37. This point was especially insisted
upon by the countries with a planned economy. See Nathan, supra note 37, at 505-509.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at §209 (criticizing the lack of protection for private
creditors). Although art. 6 of the 1983 Convention leaves the door open to clauses and to
interpretations of customary international law. RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at §201.
39. Scholars argue this point on the basis of customary international law. In
particular, reference should be made to the opinion expressed by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the German Settlers Case, where it held that: "[pirivate rights
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that "foreign debt is generated in much the same way as domestic debt",
in that some financial institution agrees to borrow money from a foreign
source to fund a variety of projects and, in return, promises to pay
creditors principal and interest at regular intervals. On the other
hand, the sovereign state usually guarantees the debt, or, in many
cases, is the direct borrower. This fact poses a series of interesting
questions: the advantage of having some or all the finances of a state as
guarantee of the payment is very important, but the lending institution
must take into account some set-backs - for example, the uncertainty
regarding the law governing the contract and the difficulties in
enforcing against a defaulting sovereign."'
The World Bank 2 defines 'total debt stocks' as the sum of public
and publicly guaranteed long-term debt,43 the use of IMF credit," and
short-term debt.5  What is relevant for the purposes of our discussion
on the fate of financial obligations during a case of state succession is
long-term external debt, and in particular all public and publicly
guaranteed debt contracted by a sovereign (thus, excluding long-term
private non-guaranteed debt).46  These debts may well have been
contracted towards a multilateral official creditor (IMF, World Bank,
other multilateral institutions), or a public entity (a state); they might
also have been borrowed from a private creditor (a commercial bank or
others).
Another useful distinction is usually made, as regards international
acquired under existing law do not cease on a change of sovereignty... [E]ven those who
contest the existence in international law of a general principle of State succession do not
go so far as to maintain that private rights including those acquired from the State as the
owner of property are invalid as against a successor in sovereignty." Settlers of German
Origin in the Territory Ceded by Germany to Poland, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 6, at 36.
40. See Richard Schechter & Stanley Macel IV, When a Sovereign Defaults, LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 9, 1996, at S36.
41. On the issue of the litigation of international debt claims in US courts during the
Eighties, see Jagdeep Bhandari, International Debt Litigation in United States Courts, 33
GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 383 (1990).
42. See, e.g., World Debt Tables (1994-95), External Finance for Developing
Countries, vol. 2, p. xv-xx.
43. Long-term debt is an external obligation of a public debtor, including the national
government, a political subdivision (or an agency of either), and autonomous public
bodies.
44. Use of IMF credit denotes repurchase obligations to the IMF with respect to all
uses of IMF resources.
45. Short-term external debt is defined as debt that has an original maturity of one
year or less, and the World Bank does not draw any distinction between public and
private non-guaranteed short-term debt for lack of adequate data.
46. This kind of debt may also pose relevant legal problems during succession of
states. In fact, a new legal regime may be applicable to private agreements as a result of
the replacement of one State by another and this may give rise to claims relating to
contracts of a financial nature. Nonetheless, this note will only address the issue of debts
contracted either by a public body, or guaranteed by such an entity.
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debts, between local, localized and general debts. LOCAL DEBTS are
those contracted by a local territorial authority - such as a province, or
a federated republic - for its own purposes according to the powers
granted to it by the constitutional 'division of powers' within the
country.47 LOCALIZED DEBTS can be negotiated both by the central
government and by local authorities, but they are meant to pertain
particularly to the development of a localized interest (a regional
railroad development scheme, an investment to start-up a mining
operation, the creation of a port...).48 Both of these cases are
conceptually easy to deal with in the case of succession, as the interest
at stake is fairly easily found to have a regional relevance; this means
that the debt will easily be accepted by the successor state gaining
authority on that territory. On the contrary, states usually negotiate
mainly 'GENERAL DEBTS' ('non-allocated debt'), debts that do not have a
specific territorial aim in mind, but serve the various purposes of state
actions modern economies require.49 These are the financial obligations
that pose the gravest problems in terms of policy of the successor states,
as well as in terms of law.
The expressions "public debt" and "state debt" are usually used as
synonyms, although, technically, they describe slightly different
concepts. Relying upon the conceptual distinction between 'state' and
'local' debts, it seems logical that 'state debts' are only those negotiated
by the central authorities of a country, while 'public debts' also include
those undertaken by regional or other minor territorial entities within
their official (public) authority. 'o In regards to localized debts
47. DANIEL PATRICK O'CONNELL, 1 STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 452 (1967).
48. These are "debts raised I.... with respect to expenditure on particular projects in
particular territories", I. L. A., Report of the 54" Conference, Aug. 23-29, 1970. A broader
definition of localized debt is one that takes into account all those financial obligations
linked to a specific territory; these are not only the expenditures on specific projects, but
also general obligations secured on a specific territory (secured debts). O'CONNELL, supra
note 47, at 407. For the purposes of this note, debts secured on a portion of the
predecessor state and localized debts will be considered together, unless specified.
49. The history of how public debts developed together with the development of the
modern state is fascinating. As a first step in this evolution, there are the personal debts
of the ruling Monarchs insofar as these obligations were not contracted for personal
purposes but for governing the state; then, at different moments in each state these debts
started to be regarded as of the Crown, and not personal of the Monarch; finally the
obligations started being regarded as of the State itself, often identified with the Nation
(especially in Continental Europe after the French Revolution). See Alexandre Sack, La
Succession aux Dettes Publiques d'Etat, 23 RECUEIL DES COURS 149 (1928).
50. This distinction seems especially relevant in the case of Yugoslavia, where the
difficult relationship between the central government and the single republics - and the
respective competences - is subject to a large debate. See Stephan Oeter, State
Succession and the Struggle over Equity: Some Observations on the Laws of State
Succession with Respect to State Property and Debts in Cases of Separation and
Dissolution of States, 38 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 73 (1995).
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
(comprising debts secured on a specific territory), these are without any
doubt part of the 'state debts,' but this does not mean that they will be
treated together with the general debts (undertaken on behalf of all the
country and not secured on a specific portion of territory).
C. Succession
Both the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties5 and the Vienna Convention in Respect of State Property,
Archives and Debts 2 provide the same definition as regards the legal
phenomenon of succession of states 3, which is:
[...] "succession of States" means the replacement of one State by
another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory".
The changes in the territory - or, rather, the changes in
government over a specific territory - may create different legal
outcomes, regulated by rules of international law on state succession.
These different outcomes can be, and usually are, labeled in order to
avoid confusion among similar situations; it must be clear from the
beginning that these 'labels', these categories, merely serve as useful
models to describe the legal significance of these replacements in
authority, and do not fully describe the whole variety of historical paths
leading to such changing.'
In the cases of universal succession - provided by dismemberment
and unification - every continuation of the predecessor state's
51. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, August 23,
1978, 17 I.L.M. 1488 [hereinafter 1978 Convention]. Although only 15 ratifications or
accessions were needed for it to enter into force, it did so only on November 6, 1996. The
15 instruments have been deposited by: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Dominica, Egypt,
Estonia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Macedonia, Morocco, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tunisia,
Ukraine, Yugoslavia. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General
(Status as on Apr. 23, 1997), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E (1997).
52. 1983 Convention, supra note 38. On this Convention, see Rudolf Streinz,
Succession of States in Assets and Liabilities - a New Regime? The 1983 Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives, and Debts, 26
GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 198 (1983). For a Soviet perspective on this topic, see G.K. Efimov,
Konferentsia OON po Voprosy o Pravopreemstv'e Gosudarstv v. Otnoshenii
Gosudrstv'ennoi Sobstvennosti, Gosudarstv'ennich Archivov i Gosudrstv'ennich Dolgov,
1984 SOVIET Y.B. INT'L L. 291.
53. The fact that very few countries have ratified or accepted has led many authors to
believe that they do not enshrine accepted principles of international law. For an analysis
of the customary provisions as opposed to those of 'progressive development' in the 1978
Convention, see ANTHONY AuST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 305-31 (2000). On
the relevance of some of the legal rules contained in the 1983 Convention, see Oeter, supra
note 50, at 89-92.
54. International scholars have neglected the study of how these replacements took
place - be it through wars, peace treaties, decolonization processes, willful unification... -
focusing instead on the outcomes - secession, unification, dissolution... - and trying to
create appropriate legal categories to describe them.
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subjectivity ceases to exist; in this sense, identity is the antithesis of
succession. When, for example, Zanzibar and Tanganyika decided to
unite, at one point - on April 25'h 1964 - they ceased to exist, while an
altogether new subject entered the international community -
Tanzania. 5  On the contrary, in all the other cases, identity persists as
regards to the subjectivity of the predecessor state - Great Britain still
existed as the same subject even after the secession of the Thirteen
colonies;6 neither Russia nor the United States as subjects of
international law were affected in their essence by the transfer of
Alaska.1 This does not mean, however, that all of the obligations of the
predecessor still continue in force as if nothing had happened: some
may have been passed to the successor, some may remain in the domain
of the predecessor, some may be transformed, some may just completely
cease to exist. In other words, it is important to keep in mind that the
modification of a subject of international law does not entail, as such,
the modification of its obligations; nor does the complete disappearance
of a state from the international community unavoidably entail that all
of its obligations cease to exist. For, however tempting this line of
thought might seem, it does not stand a careful legal analysis of state
practice, especially - but not exclusively - as regards financial
obligations."
III. THE DIFFICULT RELATION BETWEEN STATE SUCCESSION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
After examining the various 'succession hypotheses', it is
immediately evident that, in the cases of incorporation and unification,
the successor State is deemed to be bound by the financial obligations
undertaken by the predecessors.59  As the problems arising from
55. See DANIEL PATRICK O'CONNELL, 2 STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL LAw 77 (1967); The Acts of Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar 1964, Sec.
4, reprinted in 3 I.L.M. 763, 764.
56. O'CONNELL, supra note 55,. at 88-91.
57. Id. at 39-40. In these cases, the expression - partial succession - seems fit, for
succession takes place only for a portion of the territory of the state, and does not modify
its identity as such.
58. See JAN H.W. VERzIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Part VII
(STATE SUCCESSION) 3-5 (1974). In recent times, some authors have suggested that the
very "idea of a State's "identity" as some given and pre-existing social relationship looks
like a rather vulnerable piece of political metaphysics". See Martti Koskenniemi, Report
of the Director of Studies of the English-speaking Section of the Centre, Eisemann &
Koskenniemi, supra note 6, at 123. Nonetheless, even though there seems to be little
point in discussing the chronological priority between status and relationship, this note is
based on the hermeneutical tool provided by the distinction between identity of a State as
such, and, on the other hand, the continuity of its rights and duties.
159. See 1983 Convention, supra note 37, art. 39. For a recent case, see Treaty on the
Establishment of German Unity, Aug. 31, 1990, art. 23, 30 I.L.M. 457, 478 and Stefan
Oeter, German Unification and State Succession, 36 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 279-83 (1993).
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succession in the territory of former Yugoslavia do not pose questions of
incorporation or unification (at least until the hypotheses on the future
of Kosovo and Montenegro are limited to two: (i) remaining within the
Yugoslav federation or (ii) becoming an independent sovereign), this
note will not deal with this subject matter. Rather, the problems of
dissolution and secession play a major role in the debate about the
financial obligations now existing upon the new States which have
emerged from the dismemberment of the Federal Socialist Republic of
Yugoslavia. It is therefore necessary to briefly examine the
international practice regarding these phenomena in order to
appreciate the development of normative concepts and legal practice.
There is substantial disagreement among scholars as to whether
the origin of the modern international order can be traced to the Peace
Congress of Westphalia. It is however somewhat interesting, for those
who believe that the year 1648 can be regarded the real turning point in
global relations, to note that one of the peace treaties negotiated in that
occasion - the Treaty of Munster of October 24h 16486 - also included a
debts settlement." The rationale for the passing of public debts from
the predecessor State (France) to its territorial successor (the House of
Austria) was found in the consideration that such debts are basically
obligations under a sort of "droit superdtatique", "une institution de
droit sui generis"62 for which the entire fortune and all sources of income
of the debtor state are responsible within the limits of the territory as it
existed at the moment when the debt was contracted; it is this whole
territory that remains burdened by it. Thus, political changes of the
debtor state have not the slightest influence on the debt itself.
Another explanation that has been proposed is a justification by
generally recognized considerations of aequum et bonum, bona fide.'
When a state contracts a debt, it should not be allowed subsequently to
disallow it and get away with an 'undue enrichment.' Similarly, when a
state acquires foreign territory on behalf of which - or on behalf of the
good government of which - its predecessor has contracted a loan, it is
right and proper that the successor should take upon itself at least a
proportionate part of the loan thus contracted. The principle res transit
cum onere suo would thus seem to provide guidance."
Whichever of these arguments may be regarded as more
60. The text of this treaty may be found in PARRY, THE CONSOLIDATED TREATY
SERIES, vol. 1, 273 (in Latin) and 319 (English trans.) (1969).
61. Id. at arts. 85, 86, 93, 94. See VERZIJL, supra note 58, at 40-1.
62. ALEXANDRE SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ETATS SUR LEURS
DETTES PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIERES 84, vol. I (DETTES PUBLIQUES)
(1927).
63. See, e.g., Daniel Patrick O'Connell, Secured and Unsecured Debts in the Law of
State Succession, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 204 (1951).
64. Id. at 42-3.
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persuasive, it is a generally accepted rule that the successor state -
especially in the case of universal succession - should not get away with
a kind of unjust enrichment following the principle of tabula rasa (clean
slate). This is obvious at least in the cases of local debts - even more so
when mortgaged on specific territories. But in cases of general State
debts, too, and where no agreement on the matter has been reached by
the ceding and the cessionary states, the argument is persuasive that
an apportionment should constitute the general rule.
This conclusion runs afoul of the only pronouncement by an
international authority specifically on the question of the
apportionment of public debts following a case of state succession. In
fact, Arbitrator Eugene Borel, in his award of April 18, 1925 concerning
the Ottoman Public Debt stated: "De l'avis de l'Arbitre, il n'est pas
possible, malgr6 les pr6cedents d6ja existants, de dire que la Puissance
cessionaire d'un territoire est, en plein droit, tenue d'une parte
correspondante de la dette publique de l'Etat dont il faisait partie
jusqu'alorsr." However, the arbitration itself was not meant to provide
a legal key to the apportionment of the Ottoman Empire Debt, but just
a sort of appeal against the practical application of some previously-
agreed rules; this sentence was, therefore, a mere dictum, with no
practical purpose in the specific case, and not meant to express a
general rule.
Two exceptions are usually mentioned regarding the principle of
compulsory apportionment: the case of the obligations of 'newly
independent states' arising from the process of decolonization and the
case of 'odious debts.' In the first of these exceptions, scholars pointed
out that the practice of most former colonies establishes a specific rule,
which allows these new states to disregard the financial obligations
undertaken by the colonial power.' Thus, in these cases, the new states
were allowed to consider their 'financial record' as a 'clean slate' not
subject to the partition of the whole public debt of the colonial power at
the moment of their independence."
As regards odious debts, these are usually defined as those
65. Sentence Arbitrale rendue par Eugene Borel le 18 avril 1925, 1 REPS. OF INT'L
ARBITRAL AwARDS 532, 572 [hereinafter Sentence Arbitrale]. Most scholars, however,
think that this conclusion is acceptable only if an express treaty stipulation exempts the
cessionary state from any otherwise existing obligation. See VERZIJL, supra note 58.
66. See YILMA MAKONNEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NEW STATES OF AFRICA
(1983). Such practice, following the 'clean slate' doctrine, was later codified in the 1983
Convention, supra note 38, art. 38.
67. This phenomenon started only in the second half of the Twentieth Century.
Before this period, newly independent states usually regarded themselves bound by part
of the obligations undertaken by the controlling power. For example, in the case of
Ireland, the newly independent republic accepted pro quota the British debt in the Treaty
between Great Britain and Ireland, Dec. 6, 1921, art. 5. See VERZIJL, supra note 58, at
166.
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obligations contracted by a predecessor "contrary to the interests of the
inhabitants" of a territory which is later taken over by a successor
state.0 The general principle - universally accepted - is that of
avoiding the necessity of payment of these kind of obligations by the
successor state, although the real problem usually lies in ascertaining
whether a specific debt falls in this category.69 The problem is obviously
a sensitive one, and there are requests to consider 'odious' any "debt
that has been incurred by a government without the informed consent
of its people, and one that is not used in the legitimate interest of the
State,"" although this is by no means the present position of positive
international law.
Taking into account the fact that the end of the Federal Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia is usually described as a case of dissolution of a
state, one should take into account other historical cases of
apportionment of public debts in similar circumstances, so as to find the
customary international law to apply in this case.7'
When the UNION OF COLOMBIA was divided into its constituent
states (New Granada, Ecuador and Venezuela) in 1829, the British
Foreign Office took the initial position that "All three States will
continue to be responsible for any Debt due from Colombia, contracted
68. P.K. MENON, THE SUCCESSION OF STATES IN RESPECT TO TREATIES, STATE
PROPERTY, ARCHIVES, AND DEBTS 161 (1991).
69. Three types of odious debts have been defined by different names: hostile, war,
and subjugation debts. In particular, the first of these categories was first invoked as an
'odious debt', during the Spanish-American negotiations in 1898 after the Cuban war.
The American Peace Commission repudiated the liability for the Cuban debt on the
grounds that any obligations incurred by Cuban authorities to Spain for Spain's attempt
to suppress uprisings in Cuba itself were hostile to and incurred without the consent of
the inhabitants of the island; thus, they were deemed not transferable to the United
States. See O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 459-60. Other attempts to claim 'odious debts'
were made by the Soviet Union as regards the czarist debt. See, e.g., Charles Prince, The
USSR and International Organizations, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 432-33 (1942). For the
approach taken by U.S. courts, see Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396,
398-401 (2d Cir. 1927) and United States v. National City Bank of New York, 90 F.Supp.
448, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); by the People's Republic of China as regards some of the
imperial debts of the early Twentieth Century, see the case of the Hukuang Railways
Sinking Fund Gold Loan of 1911 in Jackson v. The People's Republic of China, 550
F.Supp. 869, 871-72 (N. D. Al. 1982); by the present Iranian government as regards some
financial obligations undertaken by the overthrown government see United States v. The
Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran Award 574-B36-2; Ina Corp. v. The Government of the
Islamic Republic ofIran, Iran Award 184-161-1, 8 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 373, note 89 (1985). In
all these cases, the claim was not accepted because the question was deemed to be one of
government, not state, succession.
70. See Juliette Majot, The Doctrine of Odious Debts, in FIFTY YEARS IS ENOUGH: THE
CASE AGAINST THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 35 (1994)
71. Apart from the cited Resolutions by UN organs, many national courts have
actually considered the disintegration process of Yugoslavia as a case of dismemberment.
See, e.g., the Austrian Supreme Court decision in the case Republic of Croatia et al. v.
Girocredit Bank A.G. Der Sparkassen, 36 I.L.M. 1520.
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during their Union. If it should be proposed to apportion this debt
between the several States, and that each should be responsible only for
a part, the consent of His majesty's Government, if it has any demands
upon the Government of Colombia, must be obtained to such an
alteration of its Security". 2  Notwithstanding this clear statement
implying joint and several responsibility for all obligations on part of all
of the new subjects, in December 1834 the debt of Colombia was divided
in proportions of 50% (New Grenada), 21.5% (Ecuador) and 28.5%
(Venezuela); after this apportionment among the successor states, the
British Ambassador asked Ecuador to pay only its 'share'.73
The establishment of BELGIUM in 1830 as an independent state has
usually been regarded as a dismemberment of the personality of the
United Provinces of Netherlands. 4 It is interesting to note that the
London Conference, relying on the many precedents in this subject-
matter, passed a resolution to the effect of dividing the debts between
Belgium and the Netherlands in proportion of their respective revenues.
In subsequent agreements, however, Belgium was assigned half of the
'new debts' - those contacted since the union - and the overall of the old
debts of the Austrian Netherlands. 75
On January 1, 1993 CZECHOSLOVAKIA ceased to exist by common
agreement of both its constituent parts and successor states. The
principles for the partition of both the assets and liabilities between the
Czech and the Slovak republics were based on the ratio of two to one,
resembling the proportion of the population of the two newly
independent entities. This did not prevent the International Monetary
Fund from reviewing this criterion as regards its credits, and
'proposing' adjustments according to its own economic - rather than
demographic - standards. Moreover, the old Czechoslovak debts
towards the World Bank - undertaken for well-defined projects and,
thus, easy to identify territorially - were in general treated as localized
debts, and apportioned on a territorial basis."
72. O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 388. For Article 1 of the Convention of Bogota,
envisaging this apportionment, see PARRY, THE CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES, vol. 85, 19
(1969).
73. It is not entirely clear according to which principle the debts of the dissolved state
were apportioned. However, looking at the map of the region, there appears to be a
relation between the territory extension and the share of debt each new state accepted.
See THE ANCHOR ATLAS OF WORLD HISTORY 52 (2d ed. 1978).
74. O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 157.
75. Id. For the test of the Treaty of Definitive Separation of Belgium from Holland
(signed at London, on Nov. 15, 1831), see PARRY, THE CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES, vol.
82, at 255.
76. Paul Williams, State Succession and the International Financial Institutions:
Political Criteria vs. Protection of Outstanding Financial Obligations, 1994 INT'L & COMP.
L. Q. 788-93.
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
The dissolution of the UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,?
however, is by far the most interesting contemporary example for the
succession of states and the fate of the predecessor's financial
obligations."8 This process can be divided into two different stages.
First, following the unsuccessful coup in Moscow in August 1991,
the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania declared
their independence - which was widely internationally recognized.79
These three states actually regard themselves as having restored their
independence that existed before the Second World War, thus denying
to be successors of the USSR or to be bound in any way by its financial
obligations .8
The second phase of the dismemberment of the USSR took place
later in 1991. The first internationally significant act of this phase was
taken in October, when nine of the republics8 ' signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) 2 on October 28, 1991 - well before the official
dismemberment of the USSR - regarding the external debt of the
Union. In this MOU the State-Parties declared themselves jointly and
severally liable for the debts contracted by the Soviet Union
government and by other legally authorized entities;83 moreover, they
authorized the Vnescheconombank to administer the USSR's foreign
debt.8' A press-comuniqu6 by the G-7, dated November 21st 1991, stated
77. On the problems arising from the dissolution of the USSR, see inter alia, Lech
Antonovicz4 The Disintegration of the USSR from the Point of View of International Law,
1991-2 POLISH Y.B. INVL L. 7.
78. It should be noted at the outset that the USSR Constitution of 1977 explicitly
recognized a right to secede for the republics (art. 72).
79. Actually, the three Baltic republics had declared their sovereignty in the late
1980s and early 1990, but had not taken full steps to assert independence. See Urs Saxer,
The Transformation of the Soviet Union: from a Socialist Federation to a Commonwealth
of Independent States, 14 LOY. L.A. INTL & COMP L. J. 581 (1992) - especially notes 4-5
and accompanying text. Given the refusal by many Western countries to recognize dejure
the incorporation of the Baltic states within the Soviet Union in 1940, some authors have
suggested that the recognition of their independence should be construed as a 'revival' of
sovereignty, rather than a recognition of 'new' statehood. See REIN MULLERSON,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, RIGHTS AND POLITICS 119-20 (1994).
80. See Rein Mullerson, The Continuity and Succession of States, by Reference to the
Former USSR and Yugoslavia, 1993 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 473, 480.
81. Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Apart from the Baltic States, only Azerbaijan, Ukraine,
and Uzbekistan had not signed the MOU.
82. It is worth noting that the MOU is drafted in English; this seems a clear sign of
the relevance of this agreement for the relationship with foreign creditors.
83. "Acknowledgment of indebtedness. The Parties declare themselves jointly and
severally liable for the debt, without prejudice to the original contract." See Patrick
Juillard, The External Debt of the Former Soviet Union: Succession or Continuation?,
DISSOLUTION, CONTINUATION ET SUCCESSION EN EUROPE DE L'EST 67, 75 (Burdeau &
Stern eds.,1994).
84. The Vnescheconombank was the Bank for Foreign Economic Activity of the former
Soviet Union, and it was later transformed into an 'international bank' of the CIS. See
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that these republics, the USSR and the G-7 were agreed that the MOU
had entered into force.
During the famous meeting in Alma Ata, on December 21, the
twelve remaining republics declared that the Union had ceased to exist
and eleven of them went on to establish the Commonwealth of
Independent States 5 (CIS). In the protocol establishing the CIS the
eleven countries stated that "with the formation of the Commonwealth
of Independent States the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
ceased to exist", but agreed, inter alia, that Russia should take over the
Soviet permanent seat in the Security Council.86 This feature of the
agreement might suggest that the USSR had definitively ceased to exist
and that all the former republics - except for the three Baltic ones - are
to be considered its successors, with the only exception of the
membership of Russia in the United Nations.8 7
In regards to the Soviet debts, the Alma Ata agreement made
reference to the Minsk Treaty' of December 4 - signed by all former
republics with the exception of the Baltics, Georgia, and Ukraine -
which attempted to distribute among the fifteen (former) republics both
the foreign assets and the foreign debts according to the following
percentages: 89
Oeter, supra note 50, at 78.
85. Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan formed the CIS - Sodrujestvo
N'esavisimych Gosudarstv (SNG) in the Russian text of the Alma Ata declaration. The
Minsk Agreement of December 8 between Russia, Byelorussia and Ukraine had already
stated that "the [USSR] as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality no
longer exists" and actually seemed to foreclose Russia from assuming the international
legal position of the USSR. The first hypothesis of a kind of 'loose confederation' among
the republics - called Soobshestvo Samostoyatel'nych Gosudarstv, Community of
Independent States - had been abandoned after just a few days of discussion.
86. See Yehuda Blum, Russia Takes over the Soviet Union's Seat at the United
Nations, 3 EuR. J. INT'L L. 354 (1992). See also the letter by President Yeltsin to the U.N.
Secretary General, where he expresses the wish to assume the permanent seat in the
Security Council as well as the Soviet seat at the C.S.C.E.. 31 I.L.M. 138.
87. Byelorussia and Ukraine were also members of the United Nations from its
foundation as a result of political and diplomatic arrangements made at the San
Francisco Conference of 1945, while actually Russia was not. In any event, as Russia was
given the Soviet seat, three of the republics of the former USSR did not need to apply for
new membership in the United Nations. On September 19, 1991, Byelorussia officially
changed its name to Belarus. See Konrad Buihler, State Succession, Identity/ Continuity
and Membership in the United Nations, Eisemann & Koskenniemi, supra note 6, at 268-
71.
88. See Hubert Beemelmans, State Succession in International Law: Remarks on
Recent Theory and State Praxis, 15 B.U. INT'L L. J 71, 111-12 (1997). The overall amount
of the Soviet debt was considered to be around $46 billion; some authors suggest a total of
$60-80 billion. Oeter, supra note 50, at 78.
89. The amount of export for the year 1991 is provided in order to give an
understanding of each republic's prospective capacity to serve its debt. GIORGIO
SACERDOTI, DIRiTTO E ISTITUZIONI DELLA NUOVA EUROPA 149 (1995).
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REPUBLIC SHARE OF DEBT EXPORT (in $MM)
Russia 61.34% 35.070 (78.45%)
Ukraine 16.36% 4.584 (10.25%)
Belarus 4.13% 1.601 (3.58%)
Kazakhstan 3.86% 728 (1.62%)
Uzbekistan 3.27% 582 (1.30%)
Azerbaijan 1.62% 292 (0.65%)
Georgia 1.62% 146 (0.33%)
Lithuania 1.41% 1.118 (2.50%)(*)
Moldova 1.29% 146 (0.33%)
Latvia 1.14%
Kyrgyzstan 0.95% 73 (0.17%)
Armenia 0.86% 73 (0.17%)
Tajikistan 0.82% 73 (0.17%)
Turkmenistan 0.70% 218 (0.48%)
Estonia 0.62%
(*) The amount shown is for the three Baltic States as a whole
This formula,' which provided for joint liability in the external
relations but debt management by the Vnescheconombank according to
this scheme within the relations of the republics, was soon abandoned.
Five republics never accepted it formally, while many others just
avoided payments.9
In order to try and find a solution, the heads of states of the CIS, on
March 20'h 1992, during a meeting in Kiev, adopted a Decision on the
establishment of a Commission of representatives with full power to
negotiate and prepare proposals on issues of State succession; this body,
however, was never able to carry out its task.' In light of these failed
multilateral efforts, the Russian Federation has chosen an altogether
different path. It decided to conclude a network of bilateral agreements
90. The key for apportionment of both debts and property seems to have been worked
out well before the formal dissolution of the USSR, and it is thought to be based on ratios
of population, imports, exports, and GNPs of the various Republics in relation to the
Union. See Tatiana E. Ushakova, Pravopreemstvo Respubliki Belarus' v. Otnoshenii
Gosudarstvennoi Sobstuennosti, 1999 BELARUSIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, note 4 and accompanying text.
91. SACERDOTI, supra note 89, at 149.
92. Mullerson, supra note 80, at 479.
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(Zero Option Agreements) to assume the sole responsibility for paying
the old Soviet debt in exchange for all the Soviet assets abroad. There
was a need, however, for the creditors to accepts such a swap
arrangement, and this basically came with the Paris Club meeting of
April 1-2, 1993, at which nineteen creditor countries agreed not to bring
claims against the other successor states so long as the Russian
Federation paid the dues. 93
In the end, it seems that the Russian Federation has accepted not
only the former Soviet debt, but also the old czarist obligations - the
one rejected by the USSR since 1917 and, later, by the USSR. This
decision, prompted also by economic opportunity, may lead scholars to
reconsider the debate on the rejection of czarist debt.' It is likely that,
in this case, the solution was suggested by the extension of the Russian
Federation in relation to the dissolved Union.
These and other examples have lead scholars to think that in cases
of universal succession - when one state ceases to exist and is replaced
by more new entities on the predecessor's territory - these entities
assume a joint and several obligation regarding the predecessor's debts.
Also, there seems to be a rule allowing the apportionment of the total
sums in shares through an agreement among the successors; this
appears to be true at least in cases where all of the new subjects are
deemed to be in the position to satisfy their assigned share.95
The aforementioned cases, however, do not suggest that a general
substantive rule of this kind has already been accepted at the
international level. The only true obligation, in reality, seems to be a
duty of bona fide negotiations among the successor states in order to
reach equitable criteria for a just apportionment in a specific case. This
'duty to cooperate' can be traced back to the case of the Union of
Colombia and emerges as a trend in all of the 'peaceful' dissolutions of
states which took place in the last decade or so. It is also emphasized in
93. Beemelmans, supra note 88, at 113.
94. See Accord sur le r~glement ddfinitif des crgances rdciproques financiares et rdelles
apparues antgrieurerment au 9 mai 1945, 102 REV. GEN. DE DROIT INTER'L PUB. 540
(1998). On the rejection of the debt, see supra note 69 articles and cases.
95. As already mentioned, the 1983 Convention is generally not deemed as a
codification of customary international law. See Schechter, supra note 39, at 259.
Nonetheless, some authors have pointed out that this criticism is exaggerated, at least as
regards articles 40(1) and 41 of the Convention. These articles propose a general rule
applying both for cases of separation and for cases of dissolution, stating that the debts of
the predecessor "shall pass to the successor State in an equitable proportion, taking into
account, in particular, the property, rights and interests which pass to the successor State
in relation to that State debt." See Oeter, supra note 50, at 90 (stating that this rule is
firmly grounded in international practice, and might well become future customary law as
it also respects legitimate interests of all affected sides). For the opposite side, see
RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, which envisages the 'clean slate' doctrine for cases of
secession (§209(2)), and devolution in equitable proportion for successors in cases of
dissolution (§209, Rep. No. 6).
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the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and
in the Soviet Union issued by the European Community in early 1992
that States aspiring to recognition should show "commitment to settle
by agreement [...] all questions regarding state succession and regional
disputes."9
It must be noted that such an obligation does not entail the
possibility, on behalf of the successor states, not to pay the debts, for
example by not agreeing on the apportionment of the shares. In this
respect, not only positions taken by the creditors,97 but also declarations
made by the successor states appear decisive. None of the successors
states in the recent cases tried to invoke the so-called tabula rasa
('clean slate') doctrine denying responsibility for the debts of its
predecessor; 98 in other words, all successors states arising from the
break-ups of Czechoslovakia and the USSR seem convinced of the
existence of a rule of international law that requires the honoring of the
predecessor's financial obligations (opinio juris) - and have actually
acted pursuant to this belief (practice)." There is still a question
whether a recalcitrant successor state could actually be forced in a debt-
apportioning agreement, and this is actually the case posed by the
violent dismemberment of Yugoslavia.
IV. THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE FATE OF ITS FINANCIAL
OBLIGATIONS
A. The Legal Questions Posed by the Dissolution of Yugoslavia
If one is to compare the case of Yugoslavia with the one of the
Soviet Union, there is an evident paradox.'0° In the USSR, a union was
96. See Guidelines, supra note 16, at 1487.
97. Some cases decided by Dutch courts regarding the arrest of cargo ships formerly
owned by Soviet shipping lines are interesting on this point. When a number of Dutch
creditors sought to enforce a State guarantee given for triangular barter agreements
against these cargoes, the courts ruled, inter alia, that Russia was vested with the rights
and obligations of the Soviet Union; thus, the creditors could enforce their claims against
the vessels. See Beemelmans, supra note 88, at 116.
98. Id. at 114. 1983 Convention, supra note 37.
99. In the Preamble of the Treaty of Minsk, the parties expressed this concept with
the following words: "conscious of the fact that to guarantee and to pay back the foreign
debt of the Soviet Union is a precondition to future access to the world market"
Beemelmans, supra note 88, at 112 (emphasis provided). This statement could actually
be viewed as an acknowledgment of the need for a careful foreign policy in the
management of the foreign debt in order to get access to future credits rather than a
statement recognizing a law-based duty. But in a system such as international law where
the interaction of claims and counterclaims by the very actors is a way of making the law,
these statements may prove that the international community has actually reached a
general consensus on a specific subject matter.
100. Michael Bothe & Christian Schmidt, Sur Quelques Questions de Succession Posees
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formally dissolved, but one of the former republics (the Russian
Federation) is universally considered the only state subject to most of
the legal relations of the predecessor. On the other hand, in
Yugoslavia, the process is described as a secession of most of the
republics from the Federation, but the identity of the new Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia with the old FSRY is unanimously denied.
Surely enough, the reasons for this different treatment are political
ones, and it is not the purpose of this paper to investigate whether
these policy decisions are justifiable from a legal standpoint.10'
One of the mentioned features of the dismemberment of the
Yugoslav federation is provided by the conflict it provoked." It should
be noted that, contrary to the provisions of the 1977 USSR Constitution,
the 1974 Yugoslav one did not explicitly provided for a right to secede
by the member republics. Nonetheless, the preamble of the latter
declared that "[Tihe nations of Yugoslavia, participants of the right of
self-determination vested in every people, included the right to
separation, have united in order to form a Federal Republic of free and
equal Nations and Nationalities." 103 This provision allowed some
commentators to infer a constitutional right to secession, although most
scholars reached an opposite conclusion, based on the assumption that
the right to self-determination had been 'used up' by willfully joining
the Federation.'04
After the proclamation of independence by Slovenia, Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia, the dissolution was not
immediately perceived as a fact by the international community;'
0 '
nonetheless, it became accepted reality sooner than many had
thought,'0 notwithstanding objections by Serbia, which went on
claiming that such a decision amounted to "aggression against
Yugoslavia. °7
On April 27, 1992, a joint session of what remained of the
par la Dissolution de I'URSS et Celle de la Yougoslavie, 96 REv. GEN. DE DROIT INT'L PUB.
811, 825 (1992).
101. However, see the discussion by Bothe. Id. For a brief chronology of facts relevant
to Yugoslavia's succession, see Juan Miguel Ortega Terol, The Bursting of Yugoslavia: An
Approach to Practice Regarding State Succession, Eisemann & Koskenniemi, supra note
6, at 889.
102. This is not the first time that a Yugoslav state is partitioned into more entities
giving rise to a question on how to apportion the national debt. For a description of
similar phenomena of dismemberment in the same geographical are, see infra note 184-85
and accompanying text.
103. See M. BECKMANN-PETEY, DER JUGOSLAWISCHE FODERALISMUS 129 (1990), cited
in Bothe, supra note 100.
104. Id.
105. Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 1, 31 I.L.M. 1494.
106. Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 8, 31 I.L.M. 1499, 1500.
107. Weller, supra note 10, at 588.
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Parliamentary Assembly of the former FSRY, the national Assembly of
the Republic of Serbia and the Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro
adopted a declaration expressing the will of their citizens to proclaim
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the State, international
legal and political personality of the FSRY. Moreover, and more
interesting for the purposes of this note, they claimed the 'succession' in
the rights and obligations of the dismantled federation based on several
arguments."
There has been considerable discussion on the question of whether
the 'disappearance' of the SFRY was to be considered a dissolution, the
sovereign state of Yugoslavia having ceased to exist, or, rather, a case of
secession where Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia
seceded, thus leaving Serbia and Montenegro as a smaller, but not new,
Yugoslavia. The international community, including the United
Nations and the European Community, determined that the break-up
was actually a complete dissolution.' 9 This determination appeared to
most politicians and scholars a decisive step in order to assess what
kind of liability each of the new republics was to be assigned for the
financial obligations contracted by the defunct federation. The reality
is that there was a great deal of confusion regarding the applicable law
of state succession.
Part of the confusion derived from the fact that, often, the term
'succession' is used not to signify the "replacement of one State by
another in the responsibility for the international relations of
territory," but the transmission of rights and obligations during, or in
consequence of, a phenomenon of succession. Thus, if one is to give the
proper meaning to the terms, when a state declares its willingness to be
considered the same legal personality of another (identity), it is not by
any means 'replacing it' as regards the responsibility for its
international obligation - simply because it is the same state. In other
words, no succession is taking place, and the claim to 'succeed' to the
108. Weller, supra note 10, at 596. A thorough discussion on the fact that different
succession dates seem to apply to each one of the different Republics, and on the
consequences of this fact, is provided by Ana Stanig, Financial Aspects of State
Succession: The Case of Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 751, 755-58 (2001). The fact that
the Commission was made up only of constitutional lawyers probably explains why it
considered the SRFY as dissolved based on the fact that its federal institutions were
found incapable of functioning as originally designed by the Constitution; this is, however,
a doubtful explanation according to international law.
109. On the steps undertaken by the representatives of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) in order to be accepted by the international community as the same
international subject as the FSRY, see Weller, supra note 10, at 595-96. For a critical
analysis of the position of the international community regarding Yugoslavia, see Yehuda
Blum, UN Membership of the "New" Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
830 (1992).
110. 1983 Convention, supra note 37, art. 2 (1) (A). This article is identical with art. 2
(1)(B) of the 1978 Convention.
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right and obligations of the predecessor (in chronological sense) is
pointless. In fact, this state is not a new one, because it is identical
with the 'predecessor' (in chronological sense); arguably, that same
state might claim that the seceding parts of its former territory should
accept part of its financial obligations, in particular the allocated debt -
the part localized in the seceded territory - , and perhaps a portion of
the global (unallocated) debt.
The problem of the identity of a certain state, obviously, arises in
general only during periods of conflicts and sudden changes; if there are
no doubts among the international community about the existence or
the extinction of a state, no doubt about its identity is usually posed."'
Scholars have pointed that there are major differences between the
phenomenon of succession in domestic legal systems and in the
international realm."12  When the international community witnesses
the substitution of a state with another (succession), this change is
different from the phenomenon in domestic law, the latter appearing
more radical than the former. In fact, the word, when used in the
municipal context, means the "acquisition of rights upon the death of
another," 3 while, as we have seen, in international law this expression
signifies the "replacement of one State by another in the responsibility
for the international relations of territory." 4 Thus, a state identical to
itself cannot be considered a successor in a technical sense, although it
might be useful to designate it as such in a chronological sense
(meaning the same state after succession has occurred in relation to
some parts of its former territory)."'
111. See G.J. Lehner, The Identity of Austria 1918/1919 as a Problem of State
Succession, 1992 AUSTRIAN J. PUB. & INT'L L. 63.
112. See, e.g., Rein Mullerson, Law and Politics in Succession of States: International
Law on Succession of States, DISSOLUTION, CONTINUATION, AND SUCCESSION IN EASTERN
EUROPE 5 (Brigitte Stern ed., 1995).
113. See e.g., In re Russell's Estate, 13 Cal. App. 3d 758, 769 (1971).
114. Notwithstanding the clear definition provided by the two Conventions, it must be
acknowledged that most authors do use the term 'succession' to identify not the
replacement of one state with another, but the legal consequences this process entails.
See KRYSTYNA MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 4-13 (1968); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
400-14 (1979). Also, and with specific regard to the issues arising in Eastern and Central
Europe after 1990, compare Malcolm Shaw, State Succession Revisited, 1994 FINNISH Y.B.
INT'L L. 34, 60-1, with Oeter, supra note 50, at 79-80. There is no uniform interpretation
of the meaning, however, and each author suggests different qualifications for terms like
'identity' and 'continuity' - sometimes regarding them as synonyms, sometimes creating
special categories. This is why, in this note, the term 'succession' will be used to describe
a phenomenon of fact (the replacement of one governing authority by another), while the
legal effects produced as a consequence of the modification will be given altogether
different qualifications. On this issue, see Bifhler, supra note 87, at 191-3.
115. In other words, the United Kingdom after the secession of the Republic of Ireland
is not exactly a successor state (as it is identical to the United Kingdom existing before
the Irish secession), although it might be characterized a successor in order to deal with
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From this reasoning, it follows that it is arbitrary, when confronted
with a phenomenon of identity, to infer the continuation of the rights
and duties of that state. In fact, the history of international law offers
many examples of states that, although remaining the same subject,
lose some of the rights and obligations due to an historical event -
secession or other. For example, the United Kingdom transferred some
of its national debt to the Republic of Ireland when the latter gained its
independence; this, notwithstanding the indisputable fact that the
United Kingdom remained the same subject of international law vis-d-
vis the other states."" On the contrary, succession - the phenomenon
contrary to identity - does not imply per se any discontinuity of rights
and obligations as such. In fact, Turkey may not be realistically
regarded the same subject as the Ottoman Empire; nonetheless, it was
awarded a large share of the predecessor's debts.17 On the other hand,
Russia is probably identical with the former USSER, and it accepted
most of the obligations - as well as of the rights - of the latter.1
18
Therefore, before analyzing the situation now existing in the territory of
the former Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia it must be
absolutely clear that identity of the subjects does not imply persistence of
the legal relations - rights or duties -, while succession of one state from
another cannot possibly imply the necessity of freedom of the new
(successor) state from the obligations of the predecessor."9 The relations
between the two issues (identity of a state and transfer of obligations
and rights) is a far more complex issue, one that should be analyzed in
the framework of the different possible modifications of a state 2' as well
the modifications of its legal rights and obligations that might occur as a consequence of
the secession.
116. See VERZIJL, supra note 58, at 131-4.
117. See Sentence Arbitrale, supra note 65.
118. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
119. A similar theory is the one according to which "Continuation, curiously, appears
thus to be a specific sort of succession". See Patrick Juillard, The Foreign Debt of the
Former Soviet Union: Succession or Continuation? 5 in DISSOLUTION, CONTINUATION, AND
SUCCESSION IN EASTERN EUROPE 5 (Brigitte Stern ed., 1995). See also Matthew Crawen,
The European Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, 66 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 355, 356
(1995). Confusion still reigns, however, at the diplomatic and legal levels on this point.
See Paul Williams & Jennifer Harris, State Succession to Debts and Assets: The Modern
Law and Policy, 42 HARV. J. INT'L L. 355, 378 (2001); the authors seem here to imply that
a subject (Russia) continuing the legal personality of another subject (USSR) 'inherits' the
former's rights and responsibilities. This seems a rather confusing approach since, if one
subject remains the same, it will not be able to 'inherit' rights and obligations
from.. .itself. Either a subject is different from its predecessor and inherits (some of) its
rights and obligations according to a rule of international law, or it is the same subject,
maintaining some rights and obligations, while losing others, according to a different rule
of international law. In this latter case, incidentally, it will be impossible to speak of the
principle of pacta sunt servanda. Id. at 383, 408-10. In fact, the agreement of the
predecessor with its creditors is res inter alios acta for the successor, as pacta tertiis nec
nocent nec prosunt. A rule of continuity should be based on other, more solid, grounds.
120. Thus, a cession is to be treated differently from a dissolution, and the two are still
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as the different rights and obligations.
1 2 1
Thus, this note proposes a clear distinction between two categories:
situations of fact (identity vs. succession) and legal consequences
arising from those same situations (continuity of legal right and
obligations or not). Such a distinction has been recognized by many
authors, although the terminology may be different from case to case.12
Nothing, in the history of international relations, suggests a direct
relationship between these categories, so they should be treated
separately, not mixed together; this, essentially, in order to reach
conclusions of law not based on a theory (deduction), but, after
analyzing the facts, trying to figure out the patterns at the basis of
state action (induction).
The arguments proposed by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
actually appear in part confusing, in that it was - at the same time -
arguing that there was identity (between itself and the FSRY), but
stressing the need to address a problem of succession. On the other
side, the position of the international community was not clear, either.
The EC, followed by the United States, the UN,' and other
international institutions," believed that it was of utmost importance
to deny the identity of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) with that of
the dissolved FSRY. As for the political reasons underlining this
position, it was arguably important to force the 'new' Yugoslavia to
come to terms with the requirements imposed by the international
community for becoming (or being confirmed as) a 'member of the
club." But if one takes into account only the legal position and
to be distinguished from a secession.
121. Thus, the transfer of obligations arising under multilateral conventions should be
treated differently from the transfer of public debts, or from the rights arising under a
bilateral treaty with a specific place as an object.
122. See e.g., VERZIJL, supra note 58, at 3. The author points that it is necessary to
distinguish succession "in the sense of territorial succession, i.e. the simple historical but
at the same time juridical fact [... I that a territory which in past belonged to State A, by
some political development comes under the sovereignty of State B' and "in the sense of
succession of the new sovereign(s), as a consequence of a territorial succession [... I in
rights and obligations" of the predecessor(s). Also, "whether and to what extent there is
room for admitting the principle of State succession [in the second sense] is highly
controversial alike in the practice and in the doctrine of international law."
123. S. C. Res. 777, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/777 (1992) stated not only that 'the
State formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist",
but it also recommended the General Assembly to decide that the new country (the 'new'
Yugoslavia) should apply for membership. The General Assembly acted accordingly with
U.N. GAOR 47th Sess., 7th mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/777 (1992).
124. The International Monetary Fund announced on December 15, 1992, that
Yugoslavia "had ceased to exist and has therefore ceased to be a member of the IMF"
Press Release, International Monetary Fund, (Dec. 15, 1992). The World Bank made the
same determination. Press Release, World Bank (Feb. 25, 1993).
125. Nonetheless, this high-demanding standard for the acceptance of the 'new'
Yugoslavia within the international community might be criticized if compared with the
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obligations deriving from this stand, this kind of toughness is somewhat
questionable.
If the case of the theory of secession of the republics had been
accepted, thus accepting Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as
identical with the FSRY, the situation would have resembled the one
occurred in the territory of the former USSR. 12 6 There, the Russian
Federation has not only accepted since the beginning a large part of the
foreign debt of the federation, but has even struggled to assert itself as
guarantor of the payment by the other republics, and has ultimately
'bought up' all other republics' shares. 12 7  Thus, "if classified as a
continuation [rather, identity] then Serbia Montenegro [sic] would be
the only available successor to the former Yugoslavia and would
succeed to the responsibilities for the debts and the rights to the assets
of the former nation".128 It is true that the situation in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia was rather different, especially for the persisting
conflicts featuring Serbia as one of the main actors; nonetheless, this
has not stopped the international community from dealing with the
Serbian leadership in resolving some of these very conflicts,
notwithstanding the arguments about its lack of legitimacy.2 9
ones actually used for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. For an appraisal of the different
positions regarding identity or succession in the case of Yugoslavia, see Terol, supra note
101, at 892-900 (although, confusingly enough, the author uses the term 'continuity' as a
synonym of 'identity).
126. In this case, some authors suggest that international creditors might have
claimed a "presumption [... I that the responsibility for the general public debt of the
predecessor State remains with the predecessor State after the succession" based on the
Ottoman Public Debt award. See Shaw, supra note 114, at 93. For Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro), to be accepted as identical to the former federation would have
arguably meant to gain some advantage in regard of federal property to apportion. See
Ortega Terol, supra note 101, at 926.
127. On the other side, the Russian Federation has claimed all property of the former
USSR abroad, a claim that was repeated by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the
basis of this theory, and rejected by the other republics. Also, it should be noted that the
other republics have been complaining about the apprehension of the money and gold of
the former federation in Belgrade by the Yugoslavian (Serbian and Montenegrin)
authorities. See Vladimir-Djuro Degan, State Succession Especially in Respect of State
Property and Debts, 1993 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 130, 150.
128. Carsten Eberoth & Matthew Kemner, The Enduring Political Nature of
Questions of State Succession and Secession and the Quest for Objective Standards, 17 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 753, 799 (1996).
129. In particular, see the agreement widely known as the Dayton Peace Accord.
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes,
December 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75. The judgments on this instrument have been very
controversial. "In fact, those familiar with the region now almost unanimously agree that
after five years of implementation, [the Accord] has failed to ensure a self-sustaining
future for the country. Peace has been achieved, but at the expense of internal stability,
economic regeneration, and democratization." Miroslav Prce, Revising Dayton Using
European Solutions, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 135 (2001). See also John Malik, The
Dayton Agreement and Elections in Bosnia: Entrenching Ethnic Cleansing through
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In the case of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) a theory of
'dissolution' was thus accepted, and forced on Yugoslavia itself,30 by the
international community. This created an additional problem: a
common ground was to be found, where discussions about succession
could take place, and this proved very difficult to achieve during the
conflicts that waged in the Balkans during most of the Nineties.
B. The Framework Created to Deal with the Succession
On September 7, 1991, the Conference on Yugoslavia was launched
under the aegis of the European Community; this denomination lasted
until the London Conference of August 26 and 27, 1992, when it was
changed to International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY),
which became a joint organ of the European Union and the United
Nations. The famous Arbitration Commission13 ' operates within the
ICFY.
In April 1992, the Working Group on Succession Issues was
established within the ICFY as an institutionalized framework to
facilitate rapid solutions to most of the problems deriving from the
dissolution of Yugoslavia.'3 2  Unfortunately, because of the position
taken by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) not to participate
meaningfully in this process, this body was not able to reach a
satisfactory solution regarding any of the issues under analysis, among
which the problem of the unallocated financial obligations undertaken
by the former federation.133 In fact, the official position of Yugoslavia
until December 2000 was that the four former republics had
unilaterally and violently seceded, and thus could not enjoy the same
rights as Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the aftermath of
Democracy, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 303 (2000).
130. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has long remained of the opinion it
represented the same subject as the former Yugoslavia in all international fora. See its
constitutional provision cited by the ICJ in the case Concerning Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v.
Serb. & Mont.), 1993 I.C.J. 3, 15, 20-3. Later, it accepted the general view, and changed
its opinion. Curiously, this development has led Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to
challenge the jurisdiction of the ICJ in the above-mentioned case. In fact, the Court's
jurisdiction had been based on the assumption that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
was party to the Genocide Convention as a member of the United Nations. If Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) was not a member of the U.N., it asserts it could also not be
bound by the Genocide Convention, and, thus, by its article IX - the provision about
jurisdiction. See Press Release 2001112, Yugoslavia Requests a Revision of the Judgment
of 11 July 1996 by which the Court Declared that it had Jurisdiction to Adjudicate in the
Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), International Court of Justice (Apr. 24,
2001).
131. See supra note 12.
132. See Degan, supra note 127, at 147.
133. Id. at 148.
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succession.'s As a consequence of this reasoning, the 'new' federation
proposed, on May 1993, its own Draft Agreement on Succession
between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Successor States,35
which has been rejected by the international community as complex and
unfeasible. Just as an example, it purported to take into account all
federal property and investments from the creation of the common
Yugoslav state (December 1, 1918) - a difficult task itself - without
considering amortization nor the present market value of buildings,
equipment, and commercial enterprises. 136  Moreover, Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) has been accused of blatant bad faith for
keeping in possession almost all movable and immovable property of
the Federation abroad, for appropriating all monetary gold and other
assets of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, and for keeping
approximately two thirds of the equipment of the former Federal Army
(JNA).13 Thus, there was a general understanding of the lack of a real
'common ground' for a meaningful discussion about the general debts of
the dissolved federation.
The Arbitration Commission, during the elaboration of its
Opinions, has invoked several provisions of the 1983 Convention, in
particular that concerning the date of succession of States,3 and
specific provisions regarding the dissolution of the predecessor state.3 9
But there are some parts of the Opinions rendered by the Commission
that, although not explicitly citing the 1983 Convention, seem to recall
it. Thus, for example, the Commission writes that: "the principles and
rules of international law in general [...] are supplemental, and [...]
States are at liberty to resolve the difficulties that might ensue from
applying them by entering into agreements that would permit an
equitable outcome."'" This sentence echoes the provision of Article 42
of the 1983 Convention, which expresses the duty to apportion
equitably the debts of the predecessor state taking into account, in
particular, the property, rights, and interests which pass to the
successor States in relation to that State debt.'4' Thus, the Commission
134. See Streinz supra note 52, at 229.
135. Id. at 149.
136. In regard to property, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) regarded itself
entitled to 49% of the whole federal property. See Koskenniemi, supra note 58, at 94. For
a brief analysis of the Serbian proposal, see Oeter, supra note 50, at 92-3.
137. Degan, supra note 127.
138. Badinter Commission, Opinion Nos. 11-15, July 16 - Aug. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
1586, 1587, 1594.
139. Id. at 1587, 1592. The provisions of the 1983 Convention regarding dissolution
(art. 41) are substantially identical with those regarding separation (art. 40); this fact
might explain in part the eagerness to rely on its provisions in relation to a controversial
case as the one of the succession of Yugoslavia.
140. Id. at 1589
141. For a comment on the equity principle in the 1983 Convention, see Streinz supra
note 52, at 229.
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points to one of the criterion to be looked at while apportioning the
debts: a balance between advantages and charges.
But the most important Opinion regarding the principles governing
the apportionment of the former Yugoslavia debt is Opinion N. 9.142 The
three arbiters examine the problem from the perspective of the
procedure for negotiating as well as some of the rules of state
succession, stating that the successor states must together settle all
aspects of the succession by agreement, trying to achieve an equitable
solution on the basis of the 1978 and 1983 Conventions as well as of
customary international law."' Not only must Yugoslavia's assets and
debts be shared equitably between successor states, but every dispute
must be settled peacefully according to the principles expressed in the
Charter of the United Nations.
C. The 'equitable' solution
Although the opposition by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
rendered vain most of the attempts to find a workable solution for the
apportionment of the federation's debts, the Arbitration Commission
has clearly stated in its Opinions some of the standards it thought
necessary to include in future negotiations. Some authors even
suggested a hierarchical order among these standards of procedure;'"
apart from this, probably unnecessary, institutionalization of the
Opinions' content, the fundamental rule successor states should follow
in dealing with the financial obligations of the defunct Yugoslavia is the
need to consult with each other in order to achieve an equitable result." 5
This might seem, at first glance, a rather 'empty' rule - a rule with
no real substance - purporting just to force some kind of collaboration
among successor states. Although this is partly true, several important
specifications should be made. First of all, from a general point of view,
this is an important shift in the questions posed by state succession.
According to this view, the issue before the politicians and the scholars
is not whether there is a positive specific legal rule governing debts
after succession, but whether a successor state is under an 'equitable'
obligation to take steps to correct the fact that it has been unjustly
enriched as a consequence of that process of succession. "' Thus, no
142. Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 9, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1523-5.
143. This part of the Opinion seems to have been wrongly translated from the original
French into the English by the editors of I.L.M. See Degan, supra note 127, at 168.
144. Degan, supra note 127, at 183. The author distinguishes different rules, some of
which embody general principles applicable to all aspects of state succession (boundaries,
treaties, debts, immovable property.. .), while others appropriate just for some, but not
all, of these subject matters.
145. See Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 9, supra note 142. Following this theory,
see Mullerson, supra note 81, at 493.
146. This remark is based on the early intuition by Michael Hoeflich, Through a Glass
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question arises as to the obligation for the successor to agree on paying
a share of the debt of the dissolved predecessor; the only issue at stake
is constituted by what 'equitable amount' of such a share should each
successor pay.
Second, and more specifically on the point, this duty to collaborate
through peaceful means in order to reach a common solution is evidence
of a broader general trend of customary international law that is being
developed during the second half of the Twentieth Century.4 7  It is
interesting, therefore, to find such a general principle embodied in an
authoritative opinion applicable to a specific problem deriving from
state succession. Third, the Opinion does not limit itself to envisage a
mere duty to hold consultations, but points out that the result of these
consultations should be the achievement of an equitable result.48
This necessary element was later highlighted and partly explained
in Opinion N. 13,49 where the Commission stated that there is no need
to divide assets and liabilities in an equitable proportion, but that the
overall outcome should be a equitable division."' Such equity element,
thus, is clearly not a procedural aspect dictating how a solution should
be reached, 15' but rather an aspect of the solution that the parties
Darkly: Reflections Upon the History of the International Law of Public Debt in
Connection with State Succession, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 39, 46. See also Sandrine Maljean-
Dubois, Le r6le de l'dquitd dans le droit de la succession d'Etats, Eisemann &
Koskenniemi, supra note 6, at 143 (according to whom "La mention de l'6quit6 dans le
contenu materiel du droit tbmoigne de l'impossibilitd de poser des r6ges de fond a priori").
147. See U.N. Charter, art. 33. Commentators stress the necessity for a real effort to
reach an agreed solution. See, e.g., GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 259-65 (3d ed. 1969).
148. In the last few years, some authors have reached the conclusion that even self-
determination itself should be judged on the basis of an "equitable result". In other
words, the way to decide whether one specific people should enjoy a right to secession
under the doctrine of self-determination should be to balance a wide variety of factors in
order to reach a 'just result.' These factors vary from the viability of the newly
independent entity to its degree of internal democracy and the ability to honor
international commitments. See, e.g., Bryan Schwartz & Susan Waywood, A Model
Declaration on the Right of Secession, 11 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1 (1998).
149. Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 13, 32 I.L.M. 1591, at §2.
150. This part of the Opinion seems to exclude even the existence of a rule assuming
joint and several liability for all successors of a dismembered state, although this rule was
actually invoked by commercial bank creditors in the case of Yugoslavia. See Oeter, supra
note 51, at 88 stating "From the perspective of the successor State [... ] the legal claim of
joint liability must seem an affront, since it lacks any legitimacy in the eyes of the people
concerned. Its legality will be strongly disputed, because it will inevitably be perceived as
beyond any generally accepted idea of equity and fairness." The 'equity' principle in cases
of apportionment of debts and assets of a dismembered state has been considered
customary international law also by the Austrian Supreme Court in Republic of Croatia et
al. v. Girocredit Bank A G. Der Sparkassen, supra note 72.
151. Such as the one provided for in art. 38(b) of the Statute of the ICJ, authorizing it
to decide a case ex aequo et bono. This rule has been emphasized by the World Court in
the case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 567 (Dec. 22).
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should be looking for.1 52 This, obviously, might be a difficult decision to
reach in the case of the apportionment of assets and liabilities following
the (violent) dismemberment of a federation. It is, thus, a decision to be
made by the countries involved, keeping in mind the specific situation
and the aim of a 'just result'. Nonetheless, some criteria may still help
in further specifying the general rule, especially having regard of some
general principles of international law; 53 for example, the principle
precluding 'enrichment without cause','5 the one assuring all successor
states survival as viable entities (including the effective power to defend
themselves),'55 and the protection of the interests of third parties.
156
Some of these principles have been spelled out in a more detailed way
by other authors, but have not yet been tested by judicial bodies or
other recognized authorities.
1 57
An obvious objection to this 'loose rule', at least as stated by the
Commission, is that it cannot work in an international environment
where mutual trust and understanding of the respective positions do
not exist. In particular, a deal to apportion the debts among only some
of the republics would be res inter alios acta for the one(s) not
152. This is in clear analogy with the ICJ ruling in the case concerning the North Sea
Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20); in the case
concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 45-7 (June 3), in the case
concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12). In these cases, the Court explained that, where there are
no clear rules of international law, a judge should look at various equitable criteria
seeking to achieve an equitable result (and not rendering a decision ex aequo et bono). See
ROBIN CHURCHILL & VAUGHAM LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 184-91 (1999). Also, "[en
l'absence de "systhme de normes dbfinissable ex ante., le droit se dissout en un -ensemble
ex post de solutions d'espoce [.]" Maljean-Dubois, supra note 146, at 183.
153. 'General principles of law recognized by civilised nations', Statute of the Int'l
Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, art. 38.
154. On this principle and its meaning for succession, see O'CONNELL, supra note 47,
at 243-4, 266-77. Such a principle seems to imply that an equitable division of the assets
of the dissolved federation is one of the elements to be taken into account to decide the
apportionment of the liabilities (as earlier stated in Opinion No. 11, supra note 138). See
also JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 36, at 221.
155. Degan, supra note 127. This principle might include the projected capacity of
each newly independent republic to pay its share. See Shaw, supra note 114, at 96. Some
authors have suggested that adherence to this principle would imply that the only
republic economically viable (namely, Slovenia) would be bound by all liabilities. See
Oeter, supra note 50, at 85.
156. Shaw, supra note 114, at 92.
157. A rather fancy, yet interesting, analysis of the specific criteria according to which
Quebec might be forced to assume part of the Canadian public debt upon secession is
exposed in Daniel Blum, The Apportionment of Public Debt and Assets During State
Succession, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 263 (1997). The author suggests different
approaches: per capita product, gross domestic product, historical benefits, historical tax
shares; although quite simplistic if taken separately, these approaches could very well
serve in determining the overall 'just' result. In fact, these criteria have been taken into
account by several international treaties and agreements, and cited by scholars, together
with some others. See O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 454-56.
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participating, and international law is quite clear in requiring the
consent to be bound to an international agreement.158 However, the
Badinter Commission held that all successor states of Yugoslavia had
an obligation to cooperate actively and in good faith; a refusal to do so
would entail in itself state responsibility towards other successor states
for damages.159 Thus, the other successor states, if damaged by bad
faith inaction of one (or more) of the other successors, would actually
have the opportunity to take counter-measures in accordance with
international law.60 Thus, an equitable result among the 'active' states
could be reached - without prejudice to the rights of the 'recalcitrant'
state(s) - and countermeasures could force this solution on bad faith
one(s).'
Notwithstanding this theoretical solution, though, it seems quite
unlikely that, in a case of violent and disputed break-up as the one of
Yugoslavia, newly independent states could actually act against one
another through the usual peaceful countermeasures without
dangerously heightening the regional tensions. There seems to be the
need to find a more flexible way to deal with the 'bad faith' actor, one
that would force a just solution without increasing the chances of
violent rejection. Thus, the solution adopted by Slovenia, and later by
other republics, to start dealing with the creditors on a bilateral basis
actually seems to be the only feasible 'countermeasure' to be taken. A
bilateral agreement, excluding the other successors from the procedure,
might look prima facie against the principles laid down by the
Commission; but in cases when the 'succession route'6 is foreclosed by
paralyzed negotiations, a 'direct negotiations route' with different
groups of foreign creditors might be the only realistic way to balance
the need of the successor to regain international credibility and the
eagerness of the creditors to agree on some apportionment.'6 This
158. "[A] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third state without its
consent." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 34, 1155 U.N.T.S.
341. This Convention is overwhelmingly regarded as a rule of customary international
law by scholars. For cases of treaties creating regimes valid erga omnes, none of which
applicable in this case, see MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 24 (1997).
159. Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 12, 31 I.L.M., 1488, 1590.
160. Id.
161. Beemelmans, supra note 88, at 117-18. The approach taken by the Commission,
therefore, tries not only to set up a legal framework in order to find solutions to the
continuation of legal rights and duties of successors, but also to provide means of
implementation for these rules. For a comment about the role international institutions
may play in the elaboration and implementation of universal principles regarding state
succession, see Marco Martins, Note: an Alternative Approach to the International Law of
State Succession: Lex Naturae and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv.
1019, 1049-58 (1993).
162. The expression is found in Mojmir Mrak, Succession to the Former Yugoslavia's




means, however, that there must be a deal between the creditors and
the debtor(s) not only on the necessity to apportion the debt pro quota to
each successor (abandoning the theory of joint and several liability of all
former republics), but also pro rata towards the different creditors.'"
D. The Apportionment of the Financial Obligation of Yugoslavia
The data provided by the central bank of the former Yugoslavia
(NBY) show that the total long-term debt of the Federation at the end of
1991 was $15.99 billion. Of this amount, $3.79 billion was debt
incurred for the use of the federation ('non-allocated' debt),"n while
$12.2 billion had been contracted for the use of individual republics
('allocated' or 'localized' debt).168 According to the Federal Constitution,
in fact, the republics had important fiscal and financial authority, and,
consequently, this subdivision between portions of debts is quite
relevant.67 For our purposes, the problems posed by allocated debts are
minimal, because there is substantial agreement that this type of
financial obligations is 'running with the land', and the successor state
is internationally bound to respect the previous agreement."n So,
Serbia alone is bound by at least $5 billion in local debts (undertaken
before dissolution by its republican government or other local entities),
Croatia $3 billion, Slovenia $2 billion, and Bosnia-Herzegovina $1.5
billion.' 69
164. See Oeter, supra note 50, at 96-7. The author points out that, in case of
apportionment of the debt in shares to be paid by one successor, the creditors gaining a
portion of debt against the economically more potent successor - like Slovenia in the
Yugoslav case - would be the winner, since it is the only one having a realistic possibility
of seeing its share of debt paid in the long run, thus the necessity to ration any individual
debt according to the procedures used in national insolvency and bankruptcy procedures.
For a discussion about the 'equity' principle in this dilemma, see Koskenniemi, supra note
58, at 95.
165. Mrak, supra note 28, at 160. The author cites data from the NBY and the Bank
of Slovenia.
166. It should be noted that the overall foreign currency reserves in the hands of the
Central Bank of Yugoslavia in 1991 allegedly amounted to $4 billion. This strange
situation had been created by the fact that foreign currency reserves were centralized,
while the use of debts was not. Oeter, supra note 50, at 87. Of the total debt, $683
million was owed to the International Monetary Fund, $2.14 billion to the World Bank,
$4.15 billion to the Paris Club (15 States), $4.3 billion to commercial banks; the rest
comprised guaranteed private debts and other multilateral debts. See Stanig, supra note
110, at 758-63.
167. See Mrak, supra note 28, at 160.
168. The only chance to avoid this conclusion would be to invoke the exceptions for
newly-independent states (in cases of decolonization) or for odious debts. Neither of the
options, however, was pursued by the republics of the former FSRY. In any case, the fact
that the IMF conditionality severely limits the sovereign's freedom of action and
autonomy has led some authors to suggest a legal argument based on the theory of odious
debts. See Majot, supra note 71.
169. See Oeter, supra note 50, at 87. There is no indication of the local debts of
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As for the general debt of the former federation, it is interesting to
note that no successor has invoked the 'clean slate' doctrine.70 This fact
is usually explained with the necessity, for the newly independent
republics, both to gain membership in the major international financial
institutions and to please the creditors - public and private ,alike - in
order to secure the much-needed resources. 7 ' As suggested before, all
republics, Slovenia in primis,72 started negotiating on a bilateral basis
their shares of debt, based on the first apportionment imposed by the
International Monetary Fund.
7 3 Negotiations with the World Bank,
7
1
the Paris Club member states, and with the London Club of commercial
banks followed the one with.the IMF.
7 5




170. Such a theory was developed in the context of decolonization, where newly
independent countries emerged, after decades or centuries of colonial oppression,
sometimes without any financial viability; moreover, most of the debt incurred by the
colonial power was seen as 'odious debt' raised to exploit the natural resources of the
country and to suppress its revolts. On the process of decolonization and the problems
posed by succession, see Karl Zemanek, State Succession after Decolonization, 116
RECUEIL DES COURS, 187-228 (1965).
171. One of the major causes of the crisis of the federation had been an economic and
financial breakdown during the Eighties, so all of the successors of Yugoslavia were
aware of the need to secure new loans and reschedule the old debts. See Mrak, supra note
28, at 161.
172. Slovenia even specified in its Constitutional Law of 1991 its willingness to take
over the corresponding part of the [Yugoslav] national debt whose immediate beneficiary
is not ascertainable. See Oeter, supra note 50, at 100.
173. See IMF, Quota Calculations for the Successor Republics of Yugoslavia, Dec. 7,
1992 cited in Mrak, supra note 28, at 160.
174. The World Bank apportionment was arguably the easiest one, because most of its
loans are specifically targeted at financing single projects. Thus, it was relatively simple
to locate these projects and request the republics to accept the relative shares. See Oeter,
supra note 50, at 98. On the basis of interim agreements with the Yugoslav successor
states and the physical location of World Bank projects, the World Bank apportioned the
outstanding debt of the former Yugoslavia (around $2 billions) as follows: Macedonia -
7.5% ($ 153.98 million), Croatia - 7.6% ($155.19 million), Slovenia - 7.8% ($160.59
million), Bosnia-Herzegovina - 21.4% ($ 439.24 million), Serbia-Montenegro - 55.7%
($1,141.05 million). See World Bank, Bank Portfolio of Loans in the Former Yugoslav
Republics, Nov. 25, 1992.
175. This debt, under the New Financial Agreement, was divided internally among the
Republics in 1991, but a 'joint and several liability' clause bound each of them for the
entirety of the debt; thus, during the tensions of the early Nineties, all successors stopped
repaying their shares, since they were benefiting the overall debt, and not their portions.
See Mrak, supra note 28, at 166-8, 180. For a general discussion about the solutions
adopted by the different financial institutions, see also Andrea Gioia, State Succession






Serbia/ Montenegro 36.52% 55.70%
Slovenia 16.39% 7.80%
Slovenia has also accepted to pay 18% of the total unallocated debt
of the former Yugoslavia to commercial banks in 1995.7 This shows
that joint and several liability of all former republics - a rule never
accepted by most international actors - has been abandoned even by
private investors and lenders who would have been the ones most
benefiting from its application. 177 According to 1998 data,7 1 the total of
Slovenia's debts amounted to $4,488 million ($2,212 public or publicly
guaranteed and $2,166 private non guaranteed), but the IMF still
excluded a part of the non-allocated debt not yet formally assumed by
the Slovenian government. The other republics, with the notable
exception of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), have also acceded to
similar agreements with commercial creditors.
179
The general situation is still rather confused today, but the latter
developments in the foreign and internal policies of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) have boosted hopes among both creditors and the
other former republics that concerted solutions to the remaining
problems are possible, and an agreement has been recently signed - but
not yet ratified - to this effect. The focus seems now to have shifted
from the discussion on whether an apportionment should take place - a
fact that is presently accepted by all republics of the former Yugoslavia
- to the one on which key should the parties follow for the
apportionment. This seems a great step towards stability in the
176. See Mrak, supra note 28, at 168. This apportionment has provoked a series of
lawsuits in U.S. courts, because it excluded some creditors. Yucyco, Ltd. v. Republic of
Slovenia, 984 F. Supp. 209, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In dicta, this U.S. court also points out
that the rule according to which the successor is held liable for a share of the
predecessor's debts is far from established. Id. at 219. Such theory is also expressed in
767 Third Ave. Assoc. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Republic of Yugoslavia, 218 F.3d
152, 158 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that international law did not support the landlords' claim
that the successor States were automatically liable to the landlords).
177. See Oeter, supra note 50, at 101. Another problem was also posed: as the
commercial debt was sold and bought on the world markets, Slovenia asked that
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) - as well as its entities, whether private or public -
be excluded from the benefit of any agreement reached by the (other) successor States and
creditors. Slovenia argued that these entities had bought shares of the debt on the
secondary market at a much lower price and had actually become lenders. Thus, the 18%
share of Slovenia is calculated if Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) entities are
excluded. See Stanig, supra note 110, at 762-63.
178. IMF data available at http://www.imf'org/external/country/index.htin.
179. Stanig, supra note 108, at 762-63.
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Balkans and the peaceful resolution of one aspect of the succession of
former Yugoslavia; this aspect is perhaps small in comparison with the
wars and violence that created so much sufferings in the region, but is
still relevant for the future of investments, and economical recovery, in
the region. In fact, at a meeting in Belgrade on December 12, 2000 the
central bankers of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Slovenia, and
Croatia seemed to accept the key laid down by the International
Monetary Fund, whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina insisted on a key
more respectful of the social product and numerical size of the
population."'0 Notwithstanding the present difficulties, in other words,
the discussion has in fact passed on to the issue of deciding how to
apportion the debt, and the debates on whether to pay or not seem to
have been left aside as intellectual exercises of no actual interest.
An historical remark needs to be made. The independent states
now emerged after the dissolution of the federation are not new to the
phenomenon of succession, and other similar events that took place
during last century deserve attention, since they probably contributes
in shaping the legal perceptions and expectation by local scholars and
politicians. The first example is provided by the Treaty of St.
Germaine-en-Laye, providing, inter alia, for the apportionment of the
debts among the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after
the First World War. 8' According to article 203,182 each of the successor
states was to assume the portion of secured debt on immovable property
falling under its sovereignty;83 as regards unsecured debt, the
apportionment of the total debt existing on July 28, 1914, was to be
accomplished on the basis of the ratio between the average of the three
financial years 1911 to 1913 of such revenues of the distributed
territories. Thus, a key was determined that took into account the
likely effective possibility to pay for each and all the new independent
countries; the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later,
Yugoslavia) was deemed liable for a part of the total Austro-Hungarian
debt, according to the revenues of the acquired territories.'
1
180. See Press Release, United Press International (Dec. 12, 2000).
181. Treaty of Peace between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and the United
States (the Principal Allied and Associated Powers), and Belgium, China, Czechoslovakia,
Cuba, Greece, Nicaragua, Panama, Portugal, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State
and Siam, and Austria, Sept. 20, 1919, in PARRY, supra note 60, at 9; see also 14 AM. J.
INT'L. L. SUPPL. 1 (1920). On the legal questions posed at that time by the creation of the
Yugoslav state, see Paolo Fedozzi, La situation juridique et internationale du Montdndgro,
1922 J. DU DROIT INT'L 549 and MAURIZIO UDINA, L'ESTINZIONE DELL'IMPERO AUSTRO-
UNGARICO NEL DIRrIO INTERNAZIONALE (1933).
182. PARRY, supra note 61, at 81; see also 14 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPPL., supra note 181, at
81.
183. PARRY, supra note 61, at 81.
184. Id. at 82. For an analysis of this apportionment, see Miroslav Ploj, La reparation
de la dette publique d'avant-guerre d'apres les traites de paix de Saint-Germain et de
Trianon, 1937 ANNUAIRE DE L'AssOc. YOUGOSLAVE DE DROIT INT'L 83. A brief analysis of
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In 1941, the Yugoslav kingdom was divided after the defeat against
Germany and its allies. The existing debts were apportioned according
to the following shares: Croatia 42%, Serbia 29%, Italy, Hungary, and
Bulgaria 8% each, Germany 5%.185 Such an apportionment took into
consideration only the ratios of population and territorial extension, two
highly questionable keys, at least if used alone. However, such a
division of Yugoslavia appears in retrospective an ephemeral
phenomenon, and is probably not as relevant as the case of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire.
E. The Challenges Faced by the Successor States
All of the former Yugoslav republics are admittedly facing
difficulties and problems related with their past within the federation
and the troubles of its dissolution. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
is, at the present moment, itself facing highly disruptive tensions -
most of which can be related to its unfortunate period under the
repressive regime of Milosevic.
The first of these issues facing the new government - related both
to the other successor states and to international creditors - is to
reschedule, and eventually to pay, all of the dues to international
creditors. In order to do so, the most urgent legal problem in the past
months has appeared to be to be that Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) needed to find a way to reach an effective and sustainable
apportionment of the unallocated debts of the former Yugoslavia. This
required to give up the claim of being the sole successor of the Federal
Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, 8" and to negotiate in good faith to find
an agreement.'87 Moreover, in order to 'please' international investors
and institutions, Yugoslavia seems ready to accept as a fait accompli
the bilateral agreements reached by the other former republics, and
perhaps even to accept some concessions. 88
In the light of the necessity for the FRY to find its place in the
international community, and in the Balkan region in particular, it
became possible to overcome these problems, according to an 'equitable
solution' that took into account viability as well as the present
situation, not differing much from previous examples, such as the
partition of debts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Some of the choices
the formation of Yugoslavia in the 1920s as a 'contradictory State' is provided by Svetozar
Stojanovig, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 337, 337-9 (1995).
185. See O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 390.
186. The new federal government headed by Mr. Kustunica seems to have given up the
previous position held by Mr. Milosevic, thus paving the way to negotiations. See IMF
Approves Yugoslavia's Membership in Fund, AGENCE FRANcE-PRESSE, Dec. 20, 2000.
187. Such negotiations are taking place under the aegis of the International Monetary
Fund and between the central bankers of the republics.
188. See supra note 176, for the example of Slovenia.
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- the acceptance to be one of the successors of the former federation on
an equal footing with the other ones and the need for bona fide
negotiations - seem actually to have been cornerstones of President
Kustunica's policy since the beginning of his term in office, in October
2000. As for the other ones - the acceptance of shares- of the
unallocated debt and the modes of payment of the allocated debt - these,
too, look acceptable, and an important agreement to this effect has been
signed in Vienna on June 30, 2001.19 This agreement took into account
the deals entered into by four republics - starting from Slovenia - and
built upon them a consensus acceptable for the fifth one (the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia), which had seemed the 'rogue' state of the
region until that moment. Apart from the technical details, which will
be more clear once the ratification instruments are passed by the five
countries and the implementation begins, it is interesting to describe
briefly the section of the Agreement on debts.
The financial liabilities of former Yugoslavia were divided into
three main categories in the Agreement on Succession Issues.
ALLOCATED DEBT (external debt whose beneficiary was located in the
territory of a specific successor State or a group of successor States)
remains with the successor State on the territory of which the final
beneficiary is located. 19 As for the SRFY's EXTERNAL OFFICIAL
(UNALLOCATED) DEBT to members of the Paris Club (as well as
commercial debt to banks of the London Club), the agreement takes into
account the deals concluded by Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
Macedonia, and Slovenia, and states that Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) will assume responsibility for all of its unallocated debt
and its share of the unallocated debt claims; an agreed solution shall be
found by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the members of the
two 'Clubs.' On the other side, the successor States shall terminate any
189. During a meeting in May 2001 with the international mediator sir Arthur Watts,
the central bankers of the republics agreed to apportion the assets of the Former
Yugoslavia according to the IMF key with minor variations. Some of the assets are held
by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS); according to this agreement, Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) received 36.52 per cent, Croatia 28.49, Slovenia 16.33, Bosnia
and Herzegovina 13.26 and Macedonia 5.40. Immovable assets abroad (consular and
diplomatic properties) should be divided according to a slightly different key: Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) 39.5 per cent, Croatia 23.5, Slovenia 14.0, Bosnia and
Herzegovina 15.0, Macedonia 8.0. Other financial assets (including 46 tons of gold,
various foreign currency deposits, and securities - totalling around $1 billion) whether
held by the SFRY or the National Bank of Yugoslavia are to be apportioned according to
the following proportions: Bosnia-Herzegovina 15.5 per cent, Croatia, 23.0, Macedonia 7.5,
Slovenia 16.0, FRY 38.0. Immovable property located within the territory of the SFRY
shall pass to the successor State on whose territory that property is situated; exceptions
are made for tangible movable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of one
of the successor States and which originated from the territory of the State. See the text
of the Agreement on Succession Issues between the Five Successor States of the Former
State of Yugoslovia in 41 I.L.M. 3 (2002) [hereinafter Agreement on Succession Issues].
190. Agreement on Succession Issues, supra note 189, art. 2(1)(b).
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existing legal proceedings or financial claims against each other - and
avoid instituting new proceedings or claims, whatever the outcome the
resolution by FRY of those claims.' 91 .
The third group is constituted by all the claims against the SFRY
not otherwise covered by the Agreement on Succession Issues; these
will be notified by each successor state and subsequently considered by
the Joint Committee established under the Agreement itself.'
2
Moreover, there are some small exceptions to the above-mentioned
rules; for example, the debts of former Yugoslavia under the Agreement
between SFRY and Italy on February 18, 1983 on the Final Settlement
of Reciprocal Obligations are to be independently assessed under article
8 of the Agreement.
Two major problems, however, may stand in the way of
normalization of the internal and international relations of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro); these are the possible secession of
Montenegro from the - new - federation, and the fate of Kosovo. Apart
from the economical and political roots and likely consequences of these
situations, scholars should start dealing with the possible juridical
problems that may arise in relation with them, in order to be prepared
should the necessity arise.19 3 Both these cases should be dealt with
through a clear perception of the state of the law as well as the policy
issue before each government in order to avoid, at least in part, the
tragedies experienced in the region in the past decade.
CONCLUSIONS
The law of state succession is still in flux,'" but some trends are
clearly emerging, at least in regard to financial obligations. More
important, these trends do not develop only from the cases of succession
of the past decade; in fact, a pattern seems to govern the fate of public
debts of a country which dissolves or experiences the loss of a portion of
its territory, a pattern that goes back at least to the Nineteenth
Century. With the two exceptions of separation in the context of
decolonization - under which, probably, the future of East Timor will be
assessed - and the case of 'odious debts,' the clear general rule is that
debts ought to be paid. This seems a foregone conclusion in the
contemporary world, a world where countries compete with each other
191. Agreement on Succession Issues, supra note 189, at art. 2(2).
192. Id. at Annex F.
193. Some scholars have pointed that, as a professional category, international
lawyers have a task that is not understood by most: to act as a lobby in support of those
very principles they have contributed to write and defend. See Susan Woodward, Are
International Institutions Doing Their Job?, 90 Am. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 471, 472 (1996).
The cases of Montenegro and Kosovo would pose a clear opportunity for international
lawyers to do just that.
194. See Oeter, supra note 50, at 73.
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primarily in trustworthiness before financial institutions and private
investors, and not primarily through the actual use of force anymore.
The case of Yugoslavia, actually, seems to show that the international
community, although still slow in some circumstances to stop the
misuse of force, will foster an economical - and political - breakdown of
those countries that are not able to show financial credibility.
In particular, the cases of the Soviet Union and of the FSRY testify
that new states emerged from the dissolution of both federations are
compelled to negotiate and find a solution in good faith, under two
different sets of threats. For on the one hand, if they fail to do so, the
foreign creditors - international financial institutions, foreign
governments, and privates alike - will immediately stop investing and
loaning; most of the times, this threat, although not expressed, is
powerful enough to force compliance. On the other hand, however, bona
fide countries that find it impossible to reach an apportionment deal
because of the bad faith of other successors may lawfully negotiate
bilateral agreements with creditors. Thus, the former countries are not
prevented from entering in the international financial community, and
some of their major concerns for future development is avoided;
moreover, they enjoy a legitimate form of reprisal that might dissuade
bad faith conduct on the part of other successor states. In other words,
the general rule of 'succession negotiations' among successors may be
superseded by direct negotiations between a debtor and its creditors, so
as to avoid the problems posed by delayed solutions.
This is actually the one lesson that can be learned from the decade
of conflicts in the Balkans: unless solutions can be found on a
multilateral basis among interested parties, taking into account the
rules of international law as expresses by the Arbitrary Commission in
this case, 195 each party may be allowed to take what unilateral actions it
deems necessary to protect its basic interests - provided at least that it
does so in the least harmful way for other countries. The picture,
however, is not even this simple. The role of multilateral international
banks and other financial institutions appears decisive,'9 and a primary
concern for 'new' states after a phenomenon of succession is constituted
195. It is not clear whether the Opinions delivered by the Commission, applicable to
the fate of Montenegro as one of the constituent republics of the former Federal Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia, would be applicable to Kosovo too. In fact, the Arbitration
Commission was meant to deal with the problems arising in connection with the secession
of the republics, and Kosovo is not in such a position, together with Vojvodina. See
Ragazzi, supra note 12, at 1491. Nonetheless, the principles set forth by such an
authoritative body may well be regarded as expressing the present status of customary
international law in all cases of secession based on self-determination claims.
196. See supra note 76 and accompanying text, for the relation between the




by their financial necessities before the international community." It
seems, therefore, that policy decisions taken by successor states and
creditor entities create a network of expectations, claims, and
counterclaims shaping the normative environment in which those same
actors play. In other words, the global perspectives that have lead to
the creation of an 'exception' for countries emerging out of the
decolonization phenomenon - allowing them not to be bound by the
burden of debt when becoming independent - now have radically been
rejected. Newly independent states established during the last decade
of the Twentieth Century have not even tried to suggest the 'clean slate'
doctrine as the applicable rule to their cases; they relied, on the
contrary, on centuries of past experience since the Treaty of Minster
and confirmed by the cases of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman
Empire debts after the First World War; this trend clearly suggests that
the successor states should, in general, pay the debts of the
predecessor.'9 8
The problem then arises as to how the debts should be divided
among the successor states. In this respect the trend of compulsory
negotiations is clearly emerging, and the present Yugoslav case with
the recent developments clarifies some of its aspects, but it is probably
too soon to be able to delineate the exact content of this rule. In any
event, unilateral solutions seem still acceptable whenever a clear injury
to the interests of some successor states can be shown as a consequence
of bad faith conduct by other successors; they simply seem more 'just'
than the opposite solution of waiting for the conflict situations to cool
off. Where an agreement can actually be reached, instead, States
should probably at least take into account some important factors, such
as: the special connections between an area and the debts related to it;
a general relation between debts and property accepted by a successor
State; the share of the successor state in contributing to the wealth of
the predecessor, when the former was part of the latter; the views
adopted by multilateral financial institutions on the apportionment and
membership.
One other remark needs to be made. The only realistic alternative
to the 'unilateral' - though respectful of the rights of the others -
approach as described above would be a strong effort to integrate in a
larger context. This appears especially true in the present Balkan
situation. In fact, such an 'integration project' could be carried on in
two different ways, although both, admittedly, are rather unlikely
197. See supra note 93 and accompanying text, for the case of the Russian Federation
in relation with the other republics of the former Soviet Union.
198. In this case, there seems to be very little difference between the consequences of
secession and dismemberment; thus, however one defines the extinction of the Austro-
Hungarian and Ottoman empires (dissolution or secession of some provinces), the result
does not change in respect to the continuity of financial obligations.
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under the present conditions. One way would be an expeditious
integration of the whole region within the European Union. This
approach would require - among other critical elements - the strong
political will of the present and future Member countries of that entity;
its advantages, however, would be the creation of a common space
where freedom of movement, protection of regional identities, and an
overall more democratic environment aimed at easing the present
tensions, in the medium and long run.9
The other way would be the one undertaken by the founding
members of the European Communities themselves back at the middle
of the last century: through strong political will and leadership, some of
the peoples that had waged the most disruptive wars against each other
in the past centuries decided to put aside the desire for endless revenge
and to share some of the resources - coal, steel - that had been objects
of dispute among them.2 00 Both of these approaches, however, imply
that secessions and separations are acceptable only if the parties
involved strive to develop a strategic vision of regional integration; in
other words, small nations based on common language, culture, or
religion appear to be viable in the contemporary world only through
integration at a higher level.2 1
199. For a similar approach, see Jacques Rupnik, Kosovo: Dilemmas of the Protectorate,
9 E. EUR. CONSVL. REV. 48, 49 (2000). "Between the impossible task of maintaining
Kosovo within Yugoslavia and the improbability of independence in the short term, a
third interim option could be developed: an evolving protectorate, where international
involvement would gradually be reduced to a minimum, while building up a maximum of
self-government [... Respect for these conditions [...] would open prospects for regional
and European integration". Id. at 50.
200. Admittedly, this path, too, seems impossible - at least at the present moment;
many commentators have stressed that this might have been the view in 1945 as regards
the cooperative efforts among France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux. See, e.g., Daniel
Dombey, EU Ancestor to Fade Away, FIN.TIMES, Apr. 18, 2001, at 2 (stressing the
historical significance of the European Coal and Steel Community set up with the famous
treaty of April 18, 1951).
201. In this sense, two examples from the Balkan region can be taken from the latest
news. First, Macedonia is looking forward to closer integration with the European Union,
hoping to join sooner than most neighbors, or at least to benefit from economic aids. See
Judy Dempsey, EU Deal with Macedonia Could be Model for Balkans, FIN. TIMES, Apr.
10, 2001, at 2. Second, on April 15, 2001, Yugoslav foreign minister Goran Svilanovic
announced that Yugoslavia intends to enter the Schengen visa regime (the one linking
together many continental European countries party to the EU) in two years' time. Apart
from the actual chance of implementing these plans, both these policy statements show
the willingness of Yugoslavia and Macedonia to disenfranchise themselves from the
difficulties of the present situations through a cooperative effort at the regional level.
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